"TAP não sobrevive se se mantiver pública", garante Pinto Luz

[Marco Martins]

Esta semana uma carta armadilhada matou o chefe da segurança do ministro grego da Protecção do Cidadão.

http://www.ionline.pt/conteudo/66272-gr ... inisterial


Embora este atentado possa estar relacionado com questões terroristas, tudo indica que outros grupos terroristas acentuem a sua actividade por toda a Europa.
Normalmente os momentos de crise "criam" novos revoltados contra a sociedade e contra os políticos.

http://aeiou.expresso.pt/portugal-estav ... da=f267347

[Marco Martins]

Nuno Carregueiro
nc@negocios.pt

Pouco mais de um mês depois de ter recebido a ajuda financeira da União Europeia e do FMI, a Grécia pretende regressar às emissões de dívida pública no mercado. Os investidores alertam que se a operação correr mal, Portugal e Espanha podem ser os mais penalizados.

De acordo com o “Financial Times”, o instituto que gere a dívida do Estado grego vai emitir 4 mil milhões de euros de dívida já no próximo mês de Julho.

“A nossa intenção é efectuar o ‘roll over’ de bilhetes do tesouro com maturidades de 3, 6 e 12 meses”, afirmou Petros Christodoulou, presidente do instituto.

Investidores contactados pelo jornal britânico alertam contudo para o perigo desta iniciativa, caso as coisas corram mal, pois uma fraca procura ou juros muito elevados podem afectar ainda mais o sentimento de desconfiança que afecta a Grécia.

“A confiança é frágil e qualquer má notícia nesta altura pode originar uma nova crise”, afirmou ao FT o responsável do HSBC pelo departamento de dívida. “Se o leilão correr mal para a Grécia, tal vai atingir outros países como Portugal e Espanha, que podem acabar por ter que recorrer ao fundo de emergência tal como fez a Grécia”, alertou outro banqueiro.

Atenas confia contudo que a confiança do mercado vai melhorar até ocorrerem as emissões, previstas para 13 e 20 de Julho, pois antes o Parlamento helénico deve aprovar a reforma do sistema de pensões, um dos mais importantes no plano da Grécia para reduzir o défice.

http://www.jornaldenegocios.pt/index.ph ... &id=432033

Vamos ver como corre a segunda parte da crise entre 13 e 20 de Julho...

Acredito que Portugal e Espanha estejam sobre uma maior pressão neste período.

[atomez]

Notem o sublinhado a bold... é isto que diferencia um grande trader entre o comum mortal. Não tem problemas nenhuns em ir quase all-in quando teem uma confiança tremenda na situação, sem descurar que se tiverem errados sabem sair também rapidamente...

A isso (o tal sublinhado) é o que os anglo-saxofónicos chamam de "killer instinct"

"e quando eles caem de joelhos, dá-se-lhes um chuto nos tomates"

[pdcarrico]

Notem o sublinhado a bold... é isto que diferencia um grande trader entre o comum mortal. Não tem problemas nenhuns em ir quase all-in quando teem uma confiança tremenda na situação, sem descurar que se tiverem errados sabem sair também rapidamente...

Eu vi uma entrevista na CNBC, há uns 10 anos atrás, ao Soros em que falavam sobre este episódio. Na entrevista foi-lhe perguntado se ele colocou a “casa em jogo” nesta aposta contra a libra, ao qual ele respondeu que não. Era uma aposta forte, mas com o risco calculado e que não significaria falência ou uma perda irreversível numa possibilidade de a coisa sair errada. E poderia sair errada, bastaria que a Alemanha fizesse o que depois fez com a França – ofereceu-se para comprar a quantidade que fosse necessária de francos anulando a valorização da própria moeda contra a Francesa.

A ser verdade, não terá sido bem um quase all-in, de qualquer forma seria uma possibilidade de especulação com um extraordinário retorno para o risco envolvido.

[Supermann]

...

The collapse of Greece's economy, and its domino effect on Spain, Portugal, and other countries in the euro currency zone, is in many ways a replay of an earlier financial crisis--the break-up of the continent's Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992. Then, as now, Europe's policymakers showed little patience with--or understanding of--markets. Then, as now, Germany often seemed contemptuous of the less competitive economies on the periphery of Europe.

The 1992 crisis came to a head on Friday September 9, when currency speculators forced the devaluation of the Italian lira. By the following Tuesday, Britain was facing the same fate. In this excerpt from More Money Than God, his new history of hedge funds, Sebastian Mallaby tells the story of the crisis from inside the cockpit of George Soros's Quantum Fund.

On Tuesday, September 15, the pound took another beating. Spain's finance minister telephoned Norman Lamont, his British counterpart, to ask him how things were. "Awful," Lamont answered.

That evening Lamont convened a meeting with Robin Leigh-Pemberton, the governor of the Bank of England. The two men agreed that the central bank should buy the pound aggressively the next morning. As the meeting wound down, Leigh-Pemberton read out a message from his press office. Helmut Schlesinger, the president of the German Bundesbank, had given an interview to the Wall Street Journal and a German financial newspaper, Handelsblatt. According to a news agency report on his remarks, Schlesinger believed there would have to be a broad realignment of Europe's currencies.

Lamont was stunned. Schlesinger's remark was tantamount to calling for the pound to devalue. Already his public statements had triggered an assault on Italy's lira. Now the German central banker was attacking Britain. Lamont asked Leigh-Pemberton to call Schlesinger immediately, overruling Leigh-Pemberton's concern that the punctilious Bundesbanker did not like to have his dinner interrupted.

After several conversations, Leigh-Pemberton reported that Schlesinger believed there was no cause for alarm. His comments were not "authorized," and he would check the article and issue an appropriate statement when he reached his office in the morning. Lamont protested that this was a dangerously leisurely response. Schlesinger's purported comments were already on news wires; traders in New York and Asia would react overnight; Schlesinger needed to issue a denial quickly. But Germany's monetary master refused to be hurried. He was not going to adapt to a world of 24-hour trading.

That night, Lamont went to bed knowing that the next day would be difficult. But he could not imagine how difficult.

Stan Druckenmiller, the chief portfolio manager at George Soros's Quantum Fund, read Schlesinger's comments on Tuesday afternoon in New York. He didn't care whether they were "authorized;" he reacted immediately. Schlesinger had made it obvious that the Bundesbank was not going to help the pound cling onto its position inside the exchange-rate mechanism by cutting German interest rates. The devaluation of sterling was now all but inevitable.

Druckenmiller walked into Soros's office and told him it was time to move. He had held a $1.5 billion bet against the pound since August, but now the endgame was coming and he would build on the position steadily.

Soros listened and looked puzzled. "That doesn't make sense," he objected.

"What do you mean?" Druckenmiller asked.

Well, Soros responded, if the Schlesinger quotes were accurate, why just build steadily? "Go for the jugular," Soros advised him.

Druckenmiller could see that Soros was right: Indeed, this was the man's genius. Druckenmiller had done the analysis, understood the politics, and seen the trigger for the trade; but Soros was the one who sensed that this was the moment to go nuclear. When you knew you were right, there was no such thing as betting too much. You piled on as hard as possible.

For the rest of that Tuesday, Druckenmiller and Soros sold sterling to anyone prepared to buy from them. Normally they left it to their traders to execute orders, but this time they got on the phones themselves, searching for banks that would agree to take the other side of their orders. Under the rules of the exchange-rate mechanism, the Bank of England was obliged to accept offers to sell sterling, but this requirement only held during the trading day in London. With the Bank of England closed for business, it was a scramble to find buyers, particularly once word got around that Soros and Druckenmiller were selling crazily.

Late that day, the hedge-fund trader Louis Bacon called Stan Druckenmiller. The two talked about how the drama might play out, and Bacon said he was still finding ways to dump sterling.

"Really?" Druckenmiller blurted out. He told Bacon to wait, and a few seconds later Soros joined the call.

"Where did you get the market?" Soros demanded furiously.

Around 2 the next morning, Druckenmiller returned to the office. He wanted to be at his desk when London trading reopened and the Bank of England would be forced to resume purchases of sterling. Before he had even taken his coat off, Soros checked in by telephone. Druckenmiller hit the speaker button, and his boss's disembodied East European accent filled the office, urging him to redouble sales of the British currency.

When the markets opened in London, the Bank of England did its best to boost sterling, acting on the plan that Lamont had authorized the previous evening. It intervened twice before 8:30 AM, each time buying £300 million. But the buying had absolutely no effect. Druckenmiller was manning his cockpit on the other side of the Atlantic, clamoring to sell sterling by the billion. The Bank of England carried on intervening, not realizing how completely it was outgunned. By 8:40 AM it had purchased a total of £1 billion, but sterling still refused to budge. Ten minutes later, Lamont told Prime Minister John Major that intervention was failing. Britain would have to raise interest rates in order to protect sterling.

To Lamont's frustration, Major refused to authorize a rate hike. He had been responsible for taking Britain into the exchange-rate mechanism. He feared that his credibility would collapse if the policy was seen to be failing; he might face a leadership challenge from a member of his own cabinet. Major pleaded that new economic data would come out later that day. He told Lamont to hang tough in the hope that the markets would subside eventually.

Every hour that went by, hedge funds and banks sold more sterling to the Bank of England, which was being forced to load up on a currency that seemed sure to be devalued. Britain was presiding over a vast financial transfer from its long-suffering taxpayers to a global army of traders. At 10:30 AM Lamont called John Major again to urge a rise in interest rates.

While Lamont was calling the prime minister, British officials did their best to project confidence. Eddie George, the number two at the Bank of England, went ahead with a long scheduled meeting with David Smick, a financial consultant who fed political intelligence to Druckenmiller and Soros. Smick showed up at the Bank of England's exquisite building on Threadneedle Street to find George in apparently fine form, decked out in a checkered shirt and striped tie in the manner of a London banker. "We have it all under control," George said cheerily; in the extreme case, which was unlikely, to be sure, the Bank of England would raise interest rates by a full percentage point to see off the speculators. Smick wondered whether George understood the weight of the hedge-fund selling that was forcing down the value of the British currency. The avalanche had begun. It might be too late to stop it.

Smick summoned up his nerve and asked George straight out: "Aren't you worried that you may have slipped too far behind the curve on this thing?"

George betrayed a look of mild annoyance. He was about to respond when the telephone rang. After a minute of intense conversation, he hung up.

"I've learned we've just raised interest rates by two hundred basis points," he said softly--a full two percentage points. Then he rose and shook Smick's hand and left the room running.

Lamont's plea to the prime minister had succeeded this time, and the announcement of the dramatic rate hike had been set for 11 AM. A few minutes before the appointed hour, Lamont walked over to his outer office at the Treasury to watch the Reuters screen. But when the announcement came, the pound did not respond at all. The line on the screen remained totally flat. Lamont felt like a surgeon who looks at a heart monitor and realizes that his patient has expired. All that remained was to unplug the system.

Lamont knew he had to take Britain out of the exchange-rate mechanism. But this would require the prime minister's approval, and Major was not immediately available. Lamont had his staff call Major's office repeatedly to stress the urgency of a meeting, but no audience was granted. Eventually Lamont led a team of advisers over to Admiralty House, the fine Georgian building that was serving temporarily as the prime ministerial residence; there they waited for at least another quarter of an hour before Major would see them. Lamont calculated that the nation was losing hundreds of millions of pounds every few minutes, but his boss looked annoyingly relaxed. He began the meeting by wondering aloud whether there was room for further financial diplomacy with Germany, then added that several other government ministers would shortly be joining the meeting. A meandering discussion ensued. Could Britain withdraw from the exchange-rate mechanism without offending its European partners? If it did withdraw, would there be calls for ministers' resignations? It became clear that Major's objective was to share responsibility for the crisis with the other people in the room--"we were there to put our hands in the blood," one minister later commented. It was a shrewd maneuver, and from Major's perspective, it served to neutralize potential rivals to his throne. Meanwhile, Druckenmiller and Soros were adding to their positions.

The Admiralty House meeting broke up without the decision to quit the exchange-rate mechanism that Lamont had wanted. Instead, Major insisted on another interest rate hike--this time of three additional percentage points, effective the next day--as a last ditch effort to save sterling. Again, Lamont watched the news break on the Reuters screen. Again, there was no effect on sterling's value. At their desks on the other side of the Atlantic, Druckenmiller and Soros saw the rate hikes as an act of desperation by a dying man. They were a signal that the end was nigh--and that it was time for one last push to sell the life out of the British currency.

Lamont proceeded to warn his fellow finance ministers in Europe of sterling's plight. His Italian counterpart, Piero Barucci, suggested that, rather than quitting the exchange-rate mechanism unilaterally, Lamont suspend markets to give himself time to negotiate a realignment with other European governments. Lamont had to point out that it is not in the power of a modern finance minister to suspend currency markets that trade continuously and globally.

That evening, Lamont called a press conference in the Treasury's central courtyard. At 7:30 p.m., facing a massive battery of TV cameras from all over the world, he announced Britain's exit from the exchange-rate mechanism.

The markets had won, and the government had at last recognized it.

Notem o sublinhado a bold... é isto que diferencia um grande trader entre o comum mortal. Não tem problemas nenhuns em ir quase all-in quando teem uma confiança tremenda na situação, sem descurar que se tiverem errados sabem sair também rapidamente...

[pdcarrico]

O George Soros é especulador mas é também um brilhante pensador e filósofo, e se formos analisar tudo o que ele diz e escreve, verificamos que existe coerência e lógica desde que ele começou a publicar ensaios sobre a economia contemporânea. Aliás se o propósito fosse só ganhar dinheiro, ele provavelmente manteria o low-profile, continuaria com a sua actividade de especulação e envelheceria tranquilamente.

Eu li apenas um livro dele “a crise do capitalismo global”, mas foi suficiente para perceber o génio e a capacidade para entender como erradas estavam determinadas percepções de que o mercado se auto-corrige, que a ausência de regulação beneficia a expansão e reduz as crises, etc...

Mas da mesma forma que ele critica a forma e o funcionamento do mercado (já desde há 15 anos), da mesma forma que ele entende que o crescimento da complexidade dos mercados e a obsessão que os agentes têm em comparar rentabilidades e fomentar tendências ainda que sem um suporte fundamental sólido, são nocivos para a economia, ele também prevê o que já se previa antes – que a economia tem ciclos e provavelmente haverá períodos de expansão e prosperidade mais à frente. A crise poderá demorar a passar, mas numa altura vai dar lugar a crescimento.

A questão importante é que a natureza do mundo económico de hoje catalisa os movimentos e acentua as tendências, o que provavelmente é agradável em períodos de expansão, mas que se torna penoso e muito duradouro quando aparece um quadro recessivo. Agora estamos a pagar por uma tendência alimentada por anos, que toda a gente com responsabilidade saberia ser insustentável, a de que não podíamos de forma indefinida consumir bem mais do que produzir e que os níveis de dívida seriam sempre sustentáveis. Subprime e dívida soberana tem uma relação estreita, na verdade reflectem uma coisa apenas, endividamento crescente para manutenção de bom crescimento. Chega a uma altura e não dá mais.

[Ulisses Pereira]

Drecksack, a tua participação no Caldeirão tem sido um mero disparar para criticar em tom jocoso com os participantes que vão contribuindo para o Caldeirão. Peço-te que mudes a tua postura pois não é esse o espírito que queremos para o Caldeirão.

Um abraço,
Ulisses

[Fingerspitzengefuhl]

Já que estamos numa de profecias da desgraça entram mais 2 grandes actores em cena :

(Jim Rogers)[ George Soros' famous trading partner has basically gone short Western Civilization, moving himself and his family to Singapore. He's intensely training his kids to speak Mandarin as preparation for the future. His advice: get some farmland to protect against calamity in the cities.

He's a bull on both gold and silver in the long time, though for now, he's also a dollar bull, but just temporarily.

(Marc Faber)
The Swiss-born investor made a name for himself urging clients to get out of stocks a week before the 1987 crash.

Today he resides in Thailand and is the author of the Gloom, Boom & Doom newsletter. Earlier this year he stated that he was only bullish on farmland, since when the bombs from the next war fall, farmland will rise in comparitive value.

Recently, like Jim Rogers, he's expressed some bullishness on the US dollar, though in the long term he thinks it will be worth as much as toilet paper, and sees war as a given.



Read more: http://www.businessinsider.com/market-d ... rc-faber-4#ixzz0qXa61MFv

[lunas99]

Euroverde, fantástico gráfico esse como sempre !

Drecksack só sabes instilar veneno , ainda para mais para uma pessoa que quer esteja certo ou errado é de um comportamento exemplar.
Abraço e bons negócios

[Resina]

Eu por acaso não dou credibilidade nenhuma a esta personagem... Não gosto, nem identifico no conteúdo das palavras dele alguma relevância.
È mais outro profeta da desgraça...

[MatildeSerrano]

Euroverde, fantástico gráfico esse como sempre !

[atomez]

Esta é a notícia completa:

Soros Says ‘We Have Just Entered Act II’ of Crisis

June 10 (Bloomberg) -- Billionaire investor George Soros said “we have just entered Act II” of the crisis as Europe’s fiscal woes worsen and governments are pressured to curb budget deficits that may push the global economy back into recession.

“The collapse of the financial system as we know it is real, and the crisis is far from over,” Soros said today at a conference in Vienna. “Indeed, we have just entered Act II of the drama.”

Soros, 79, said the current situation in the world economy is “eerily” reminiscent of the 1930s with governments under pressure to narrow their budget deficits at a time when the economic recovery is weak.

Concern that Europe’s sovereign-debt crisis may spread sent the euro to a four-year low against the dollar on June 7 and has wiped out more than $4 trillion from global stock markets this year. Europe’s debt-ridden nations have to raise almost 2 trillion euros ($2.4 trillion) within the next three years to refinance, according to Bank of America Corp.

“When the financial markets started losing confidence in the credibility of sovereign debt, Greece and the euro have taken center stage, but the effects are liable to be felt worldwide,” Soros said.

Soros gained fame in the 1990s when he reportedly made $1 billion correctly betting against the British pound. He also wagered that Germany’s mark would appreciate after the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and that Japanese stocks would start to fall in the same year. His firm, Soros Fund Management LLC, manages about $25 billion.

Credit default swaps, which aim to protect bondholders against the risk of a default, are dangerous and a “license to kill,” Soros said today. CDSs should only be allowed if there is an insurable interest, he said.

[Pata-Hari]

O canguru disse "desinteressado" e não "desinteressante".

[canguru]

Comentário desinteressado esse como é hábito nesta personagem.

Não!
Acho até muito interessante e confio plenamente em Soros.

Porquê?

- Se lêsses o livro dele já sabias.

Sabia o quê? Que ele não faz comentários desinteressandos (i.e., sem tentar influênciar as massas)?

[EuroVerde]

Comentário desinteressado esse como é hábito nesta personagem.

Não!
Acho até muito interessante e confio plenamente em Soros.

Porquê?

- Se lêsses o livro dele já sabias.

No SP500 noto algum movimento errático por parte dos bulls.
Existem 2 LTAs que foram quebradas em baixa e uma delas o indice voltou testa-la hoje sem conseguir fechar acima dela.
Existe também uma LTD que vem desde o dia do Papa a Fátima (13Maio) que penso fechou hoje acima dela.
A vela de hoje poderá ser homologa à de 30 de Setembro 2008.

[canguru]

Comentário desinteressado esse como é hábito nesta personagem.

[Marco Martins]

Só se o Soros estiver a falar dos states, porque na Europa estão a tentar controlar os excessos...

[Pata-Hari]

Soros
"Acabámos de entrar no acto dois" da crise
O investidor milionário George Soros, afirmou hoje que "acabámos de entrar no acto dois" da crise.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jornal de Negócios Online
negocios@negocios.pt


O investidor milionário George Soros, afirmou hoje que “acabámos de entrar no acto dois” da crise.

Numa conferência de imprensa, Soros disse que a crise ainda não terminou, de acordo com a Bloomberg.

O responsável defendeu que a actual situação é muito parecida com a dos anos 30 e que os mercados não serão capazes de corrigir os seus próprios excessos, de acordo com a Bloomberg.