Ao minuto: Trump critica violações do cessar-fogo e aponta especialmente a Israel

[atomez]

Teorias de jogo.

Wall Street bets on 75% chance of Greek default

Given these dramatic stakes, the risk of a Greek default has gone way up. One way to measure that risk is by looking at the skyrocketing price of insurance policies that would pay out if Greek bonds go bust. The cost to insure Greek debt for one year against the risk of default has skyrocketed 456% since the start of the 2015, according to FactSet data.

These insurance-like contracts, known as credit default swaps, imply there is a 75% to 80% probability of Greece defaulting on its debt, according to Jigar Patel, a credit strategist at Barclays.

The probability of a Greek default soars to a whopping 95% for five-year CDS, Patel said.

[RaposoTavares]

A ler.

Negotiations look increasingly like a deadly scene in ‘Rebel Without A Cause’
Por: Gideon Rachman


When the radical left won power in Greece in January much was made of the fact that Yanis Varoufakis, the new finance minister, is an academic economist. Many expected that Greece’s negotiating strategy would display a new subtlety and brilliance, now that it was guided by the co-author of Game Theory — A Critical Introduction .
Yet, a few months on, Greece is running out of friends and money. As a debt default looms, even some sympathetic commentators are baffled by the Athens government’s actions.So what game are the Greeks playing? Here are four possible hypotheses:
Game 1: they are bluffing and they still think they can win. The Tsipras government may still believe that the EU will not ultimately tolerate the break-up of its most important project — the European single currency. The loss of political prestige would be too enormous; the risks of financial contagion too great. But the EU will not make serious concessions until the moment that it really believes that Greece is about to crash out of the euro. So some evidence of chaos and panic in Athens may actually be necessary to convince the EU that the end game is approaching.
Game 2: they are bluffing and they are only now realising that they have miscalculated. Alexis Tsipras and his Syriza party are newcomers to the high politics of the EU. They won election in January believing that they could win the argument against “austerity” and find like-minded friends across Europe. The past few months have been a painful education in the realities of European politics. Mr Varoufakis’s theories have not worked out in practice, leading him to lament the absence of “a skilled game theorist on their side”. But Syriza’s belated realisation that it must largely accept the terms of its creditors — or quit the euro — has come perilously late.
Game 3: this is all about retaining power at home. The erratic negotiating style of the Greek government betrays the chaos in Athens. In part, this is a reflection of the inexperience and lack of resources of the Syriza team. But the party may also be trapped by the internal politics of Greece. Syriza is a coalition and the hard left of the party is likely to split off if Mr Tsipras is seen to accept austerity in return for a new agreement with Greece’s creditors. The broader electorate may also be none too impressed. Cutting a deal might therefore mark the end of Mr Tsipras’s political career.
Game 4: Greece actually wants to leave the euro. Among the academics and politicians who have advised Syriza there are undoubtedly some who have always believed that Greece ultimately has to leave the euro. They think that their country can only escape its downward economic spiral if it repudiates some or all of its debt — and they know that the price of that is likely to be ejection from the euro. What is more, once Greece is out of the euro, a new, floating currency might help restore the country’s competitiveness. Some in Syriza also believe that the euro and the EU in general are inseparable from the “neoliberal” economics that they reject.
The difficulty is that Syriza came to power against the background of opinion polls showing that a large majority of Greeks want to stay inside the euro. So it is crucial for the Greek government to construct a narrative in which Syriza is seen to make a genuine effort to stay inside the single currency — only to be ejected by unreasonable foreigners, led by the Germans.
Which of these games is actually being played in Athens? I suspect that elements of all four are playing out. Even now, decision makers in Athens must be hovering between options one and two — convinced at one moment that the EU will ultimately cut a better deal, fearing at another that no such deal will emerge.
Some of Mr Tsipras’s apparently erratic behaviour — such as promising to make a payment to the IMF and then delaying it — also reflect his political difficulties at home. And while the group of Syriza thinkers who actually want Greece to leave the euro may be in a minority, their number will surely grow as the crisis intensifies.
The uncertainty about what is driving Athens is only amplified because a parallel set of questions can be asked about the motivations of Brussels and Berlin. It could equally well be argued that the German government is bluffing, in the expectation of Greek capitulation; or that the team around Chancellor Angela Merkel has miscalculated in expecting the Greeks to “behave reasonably”; or that the German government, like its Greek counterpart, is trapped by domestic politics; or, finally, that there are many in Germany, particularly in the finance ministry, who now actively want to force Greece out of the euro.
Uncertainty on one side of the negotiating table only increases the uncertainty on the other side. If both sides think that the other side’s calculations are shifting, then it is harder to make a reasoned assessment of what needs to be done to secure a deal.
Unfortunately, the “game” that is currently under way between Greece and its creditors looks less like a sophisticated exercise in a Cambridge seminar room than the scene in Rebel Without A Cause, in which two cars race towards a cliff — and each driver waits for the other’s nerve to crack first. In the movie, the scene ends with one of the drivers plunging over the edge.
gideon.rachman@ft.com

in: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/98eb8b70-1335-11e5-bd3c-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=uk#axzz3dGXR2JPl

[Dr Tretas]

E os juros do país com maior divida publica e privada da Europa já vai nos 3.1% a 10 anos. Ai o castelo de cartas

Afinal, há tantas formas de contabilizar a dívida... Outra é a dívida externa líquida:

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tipsii30&plugin=1

Aqui já não somos os piores, temos o Chipre e a Grécia à frente. Gostava era de saber o que se passa com Malta, Irlanda e Luxemburgo, países que têm quantidades colossais de crédito sobre o estrangeiro. Mas que raio? Expliquem-me s.f.f.

[jccgold]

E os juros do país com maior divida publica e privada da Europa já vai nos 3.1% a 10 anos. Ai o castelo de cartas

[fff]

Sai mais uma solução radical para a mesa do fundo ( Eles tentam todas as estrategias de cedencia, a ver se a malta vai na cantiga, são muitos anos e uma longa experiencia dos gregos)

Se querem tomar uma solução radical, tomam-na e escusam de vir comunicar hipoteses para tentar assustar os credores.

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-06-1 ... -euro-exit

Now, it appears as though EU officials aren’t the only ones drawing up plans for capital controls and Grexit because as The Telegraph reports, the far-left faction within Syriza is ready to transition back to the drachma. Here’s more:

The radical wing of Greece's Syriza party is to table plans over coming days for an Icelandic-style default and a nationalisation of the Greek banking system, deeming it pointless to continue talks with Europe's creditor powers.

Syriza sources say measures being drafted include capital controls and the establishment of a sovereign central bank able to stand behind a new financial system. While some form of dual currency might be possible in theory, such a structure would be incompatible with euro membership and would imply a rapid return to the drachma.

The confidential plans were circulating over the weekend and have the backing of 30 MPs from the Aristeri Platforma or 'Left Platform', as well as other hard-line groupings in Syriza's spectrum. It is understood that the nationalist ANEL party in the ruling coalition is also willing to force a rupture with creditors, if need be.

"This goes well beyond the Left Platform. We are talking serious numbers," said one Syriza MP involved in the draft.

"We are all horrified by the idea of surrender, and we will not allow ourselves to be throttled to death by European monetary union," he told the Telegraph.

Syriza's Left Platform has studied the Icelandic model, extolled as a success story by the International Monetary Fund itself.

"The Greek banks must be nationalised immediately, along with the creation of a bad bank. There may have to be some restrictions on cash withdrawals," said one Syriza MP.

"The banks will go ape-s*** of course. We are aware that there will be a lot of lawsuits but at the end of the day we are a sovereign power," he said.

Syriza has a strong ideological motive to strike at the financial elites. They view the banks as the nerve centre of an entrenched oligarchy that has run the country for more than half a century as a family business. Forcing these institutions into bankruptcy provides cover for a socio-political purge, best understood as a revolution.

[Dr Tretas]

Quem quer brincar aos impérios que empreste dinheiro aos gregos. Eles que se financiem com russos, americanos ou chineses, tanto faz, desde que não sejam da zona euro. Façam fazer a valer a sua supostamente fabulosa posição geo-estratégica, vá, estou à espera

[RaposoTavares]

Ora, esta! O Junker não fala com o Tsirpas, que acusa de mentir quanto às propostas daTroika', mas fala com outros políticos gregos, o 'apagado presidente da Grécia, finalmente!, lá disse qualquer coisinha: O homem diz que gosta muito do €. O Obama quer -quer?- uma solução para evitar que a economia mundial estiole...
Isto anda bonito...
http://www.theguardian.com/business/live/2015/jun/16/greek-crisis-negotiations-deadlocked-as-time-runs-short-live-updates#block-55806e01e4b0e91d8f409606

[Ativo]

o que eu queria dizer com as observações colocadas era enfatizar como o povo português, de tempos a tempos, toma medidas «fraturantes», mas depois não assumem as consequências das suas escolhas e passam a vida a queixar-se.

os olhos dos portugueses estão neste momento voltados para a Grécia.

vamos ver o que dá.

P.S.: Uma revolução é feita pelo povo.

Uma revolução, nem sempre, é feita pelo povo: há revoluções populares e há revoluções que o não são.

[JohnyRobaz]

On a day marked by escalating brinkmanship and fiery rhetoric, Greece’s head of state, president Prokopis Pavlopoulos has, in a rare intervention, stepped in saying “a solid national front” is needed to ensure the country remains in the euro zone.

Pavlopoulos, a veteran former conservative MP, whose election earlier this year won unanimous support in the 300-seat House, said it was his role to secure Athens’ place at Europe’s core in the single currency.

In comments aired this afternoon, Pavlopoulos said:



“I know that my role, not least because of my election by the majority of the parliament who chose me, is to ensure the course of the country in Europe and the euro zone.”

Adding:



“In front of this aim there has to be a solid internal front of all democratic forces. Petty party views and friction can’t come before the achievement of such a goal.”

The head of state, who once represented the staunchly pro-European centre right New Democracy party, said he was “determined in the framework of my authorities and touching the boundaries of my authorities to fulfill this mission.”





Penso que aponta para velas verdes amanhã...

[feliztrader]

...

[fff]

Acho que o TSIPRAS com este tipo de afirmações está na caminho de rapidamente fechar um acordo.

Tsipras Slams "Criminal" IMF In Defiant Speech

In the wake of reports that Greece could be headed for a "Lehman Weekend" complete with capital controls and an "emergency" Sunday meeting, the headlines are coming fast and furious on Tuesday morning, with Tsipras calling the IMF's stance "criminal" and Merkel digging in for the worst.

Merkel and Tsipras play headline hockey...

TSIPRAS SAYS OLIGARCHS NOT PENSIONERS SHOULD PAY FOR CRISIS
TSIPRAS SAYS ECB INSISTS ON TACTICS THAT STRANGLE GREECE
TSIPRAS SAYS CREDITORS' PROPOSALS LEAD TO DEEPER RECESSION
TSIPRAS: IMF HAS `CRIMINAL' RESPONSIBILITY FOR GREEK SITUATION
MERKEL SAYS UNFORTUNATELY NOT MUCH THAT'S NEW ON GREECE
TSIPRAS SAYS TIME FOR EUROPE TO CONSIDER FUTURE OF EURO AREA
MERKEL SAYS GREECE MUST REACH DEAL WITH CREDITOR INSTITUTIONS
MERKEL SAYS CAN'T SAY IF CREDITORS, GREECE WILL AGREE BY THURS

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-06-1 ... ant-speech

[fff]

"Lehman Weekend" Looms For Greece As Europe Readies "Emergency" Sunday Meeting


Last week, Greek PM Alexis Tsipras submitted two three-page proposals that were ostensibly designed to close the gap with creditors. EU officials were incredulous, calling the drafts “not serious.”

Tsipras had effectively resubmitted Greece’s previous proposal (i.e. a proposal that did not include concessions on a VAT hike or pension cuts) only this time, he included a second document that outlined how Athens hoped to tap leftover bank recap funds from the EFSF and bailout money from the ESM. Greece took that same proposal to Brussels over the weekend and it didn’t fly there either, leaving Europe to wonder just how far Tsipras was willing to go with the brinksmanship.

Here’s Open Europe summarizing the drama:

German daily Süddeutsche Zeitung reports that Eurozone countries have agreed on a contingency plan if no deal between Greece and its lenders is struck by this weekend. According to the paper, if this week’s Eurogroup meeting failed to yield an agreement, Eurozone leaders would hold an emergency summit – potentially as early as Friday evening. The contingency plan would involve imposing capital controls on Greek banks over the weekend.

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-06-1 ... ay-meeting

[fff]

Live Squawk ‏@livesquawk

[BREAKING] Greek FinMin Varoufakis Will Not Present New Proposals At This Week’s Eurogroup -- Bild

[antonioraposol]

aqui há tempos ouvi dizer que a Rússia está a pensar em mandar o gás através da Turquia e Grécia, ... sim, um gasoduto a construir, ... não deve ser verdade.

* sim, o Turkstream evitando assim a Bulgária (UE) e co-adjuvando os turcos e gregos (ambos com os seus "quês" com a UE).

será que por cá o BE e CDU andam a sonhar com o poleiro

* creio que mesmo assim não: depois de tanta emigração e o envelhecimento/morte das camadas mais idosas, quem cá fica não deve ser votante destes a não ser por repúdio ao centrão.

reza a nossa história que mataram o rei e o seu filho para acabar com a monarquia

* o regícidio perpetrado pela Carbonária não deve ser imputado a estes partidos.

também contam que houve uma revolução e repetem isto todos os anos à malta nova para ver se cola, mas na verdade que foi um assalto ao poder, ... tipo golpe de estado;

* as mudanças de regime são o que são, mas daí a dizer que o 25 de Abril não foi uma revolução...

e ultimamente um ex-primeiro ministro está exilado numa cadeia por perseguição política.

* que há fumo há, são muitas coincidências, muito $ à mistura, coisas pouco claras. A questão é a Justiça conseguir prová-lo e se fosse assim poucos são os políticos sem rabo preso.

[/quote]

[antonioraposol]

Neste tabuleiro da geopolítica/finanças, o que entendi foi:
- o FMI quer mais cortes em termos de despesa/défice (pensões/salários, etc.), e também um haircut na dívida que aliás tem sido o modus operandi do FMI (p. ex. Brady Bonds na América Latina) de forma a que a Grécia possa tentar sair do poço. Interesses dos EUA e até dos emergentes que já passaram por crises de dívida.
- Os europeus parecem mais sensíveis ao relaxamento da despesa/défice (afinal, até a França não tem conseguido reduzir o défice), mas nem admitem um haircut na dívida porque são os maiores credores (como explicar aos eleitorados um 2.º perdão e o 3.º resgate a seguir). Interesses da UE.
Os EUA querem um acordo ao estilo do FMI para salvaguardar a posição geopolítica da NATO no Mediterrâneo. A Rússia fica à espreita a ver o que dá. O Putin tem os seus problemas por causa da Arábia Saudita que tem inundado o mercado de petróleo (acho que li algures que para eles é rentável até mesmo a 30USD o barril) para ver se destrói os produtores americanos de "fracking/shale oil". O Putin tem muita escola (judo/KGB) e não vai dar um passo em falso. Só entrará em cena se houver divórcio UE/Grécia para ser visto a ajudar os irmãos ortodoxos e não como o urso do Leste que mais uma vez marcha para Oeste.
Os gregos não querem sair da UE/euro, preferem ser expulsos. A UE não quer expulsá-los, prefere que eles saiam. É uma questão de ficar bem/mal nos livros de História.

- Há eleições no Outono em Portugal e Espanha. Os governos ibéricos de direita, alinhados com a austeridade, têm sido opositores a um sweet deal com a Grécia. Se a UE cede aos gregos... muita gente vai tirar a cartola aos gregos e estará tentada a votar em partidos estilo Syriza e exigir um negócio grego! Ou há moral ou comem todos.

Existe muito jogo (também li algures que o Varoufakis é especialista em teoria dos jogos) financeiro e político. Há muita estratégia aqui, muito good cop, bad cop.
Até a questão de o Syriza deixar os gregos tirarem o $ dos bancos e do país e não impor controlos de capital tem a ver com ideologia e estratégia: deixar as elites financeiras gregas a tremer com as falências dos bancos e posterior nacionalização e o BCE que tem um ELA de mais de 80bn de euros. E o $ não está perdido para os gregos: vai voltar a casa.

Não é um win-win scenario e alguém vai ficar a perder.
Quem cederá primeiro?

[Optimiza]

Alea, jacta est para dia 19 de Junho?

June 16: Austrian Chancellor Werner Faymann visits Athens
•Greek PM Alexis Tsipras scheduled to fly to Russia - expected to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin at St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, June 18-20.

June 17: Governing Council of the ECB non-monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt
•Greece to sell 1 billion euros of 3-month T-bills.

June 18: Eurogroup meeting in Luxembourg
•European Council President Donald Tusk has signaled this might be the day when the currency bloc decides Greek “game is over”. General Council meeting of the ECB in Frankfurt.

[b]June 19: EU finance ministers meeting. Greece needs to refinance 1.6 billion euros in T-bills. Greece needs to service about 85 million euros in interest on bonds held by the ECB.
[/b]
June 30: Greece’s euro-area-backed bailout extension expires
•Total payments of more than 1.5 billion euros to the IMF come due, after decision to bundle tranches due earlier in June

July: About 1 billion euros in interest payments due
•Bulk of amortization and interest payments due on July 18-20 on bonds held by the ECB

July 1: Governing Council of the ECB non-monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt

July 8: Greece to sell 26-week bills

July 10: Greece needs to refinance 2 billion euros in T-bills

July 13: IMF loans repayment totaling about 450 million euros due. Eurogroup meeting

July 14: Greece needs to repay 11.67 billion Japanese yen (about $93 million) in yen loans

July 16: Governing Council monetary policy meeting of the ECB in Frankfurt

July 17: Greece needs to pay about 71 million euros in interest on the 3-yr bond it sold in 2014
•Greece needs to refinance 1 billion euros in T-bills

July 20: Greece needs to repay about 3.5 billion euros in bond redemptions; bonds held by the ECB

July 31: Moody’s due to review Greece’s sovereign debt

August: 600 million euros in interest payments
•Includes an 80 million euro payment to the European Financial Stability Facility

August 1: Interest on IMF loans totaling about 175 million euros; payment due by August 5

August 5: Governing Council of the ECB non-monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt. Greece to sell 26-week bills

August 7: Greece needs to refinance 1 billion euros in T-bills

August 14: Greece needs to refinance 1.4 billion euros in T-bills

August 20: Greece needs to repay about 3.2 billion euros in bond redemptions; bonds held by the ECB

[atomez]

Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras has four days to capitulate to demands to keep Greece in the euro -- or prepare for a messy divorce.

[feliztrader]

...

[Royal_Flush]

Mudanças socio-culturais levam décadas

No Sporting demorou 1 ano. E levava 30 anos de défice também. Tem a ver com competencia e seriedade de quem governa

Com perdão de divida ficou mais fácil... E por isso deu lucro

rasgar contratos e adiar tudo para os tribunais também ajuda...
(depois se os tribunais decidirem que tem de pagar tudo + juros isso não interessa...se calhar já nem sou eu que cá estou para pagar )

o Syriza bem que podia aprender umas coisas com o Bruno de Carvalho...

[fff]

O Proximo fim de semana pode ser diferente . Vou acompanhar a negociação no final de semana, pois palpita-me que o churrasco vai queimar. Está há demasiado tempo em lume brando.

Até quarta deve ficar tudo á espera da Yellen , mas a partir de quinta espero mais ansiedade e expectavel volatilidade nos mercados. Vamos acompanhando.

Eurozone To Impose Capital Controls On Greece If No Deal By Weekend: German Press

" The euro partners have agreed in the face of the solidified negotiations with Greece on a contingency plan for Athens. This became known on Monday in Berlin and Brussels. It stipulates that creditors want to give the Greeks initially another chance and wait to see if by the end of the week it is possible to Euro finance ministers to agree with the government in Athens to the corners to meet the current emergency program. The ministers meet Thursday and Friday in Luxembourg.



Elapses this deadline without agreement, to be convened without further delay a special meeting of heads of state and government in Brussels. In an interview for this is Friday night. At the special summit a political solution should be sought again. French President Francois Hollande warned on Monday against the failure of the negotiations. The deadlines were extremely short. "I have often said: caution, we now come in a period that can be turbulent, if no agreement is found," he said during a visit to the air show in Le Bourget near Paris.

Via Bloomberg:

EURO-ZONE COUNTRIES READY CAPITAL COUNTRIES FOR GREECE: PAPER
CAPITAL CONTROLS TO BE READIED FROM COMING WEEKEND: PAPER
EURO-ZONE COUNTRIES REACH GREECE EMERGENCY PLAN: SUEDDEUTSCHE

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-06-1 ... rman-press

[jccgold]

Por isso, concluindo, e sem crer entrar no papel do estado, ou a dificuldade de gerir uma empresa de 1 milhão de funcionários que presta serviços a 10 milhões de clientes, existem diferencias bastante significativas entre estados "soberanos" e empresas.

A unica diferenca só a de que é muito mais dificil falir um Estado do que uma empresa. Politicos sérios e competentes nao têm qq dificuldade em gerir um país.

Mudanças socio-culturais levam décadas

No Sporting demorou 1 ano. E levava 30 anos de défice também. Tem a ver com competencia e seriedade de quem governa

Com perdão de divida ficou mais fácil... E por isso deu lucro

Perdão? Fonte? As unicas benesses que conheço foi que o Sporting construiu o Estádio nos seus próprios terrenos, e o do Benfica foi em terrenos oferecidos pelo Santana Lopes no valor de 45M€ e claro o centro de estágio do Porto em Gaia a pagar 500€ ano durante uns 500 anos benesse do Menezes. Benesses só nos rivais do Sporting.

[Goya777]

Mudanças socio-culturais levam décadas

No Sporting demorou 1 ano. E levava 30 anos de défice também. Tem a ver com competencia e seriedade de quem governa

Com perdão de divida ficou mais fácil... E por isso deu lucro

[richardj]

Entretanto "chamam nomes" aos credores.

http://expresso.sapo.pt/internacional/2 ... m-a-Grecia

[Optimiza]

A Grécia é o Olimpo (embora tenha "Bad" ao pescoço)!

Ainda melhor ficaria se emagrecesse a dívida com um Default a institucionais. Queimava 302 mil milhões de dívida e ficava apenas a gerir 48 mil milhões usd de dívida a privados (Banca sobretudo Grega e Fundos), o que tecnicamente, para o S&P e Moodys não é um default (conseguiam continuar a financiar-se, com rating, na Ásia, Rússia e Médio Oriente). Faziam a quadratura do círculo!

De permeio, "queimavam" 230 mil milhões usd de créditos dos estados membros eurozona (Portugal incluído)+ BCE. Depois, sem afluxo de euros "emprestadados", o dracma lá voltava (e os alemães com saudades do marco e os Franceses do franco...).

Definitivamente, não seria o melhor dos cenários para os Eurozonenses!

nota de quem quer ver um Acordo entre as partes - Um verdadeiro default é improvável e indesejável! (excepto para os gregos e apenas em noites de insónia).

[654235]

DEmasiadas tatuagens para o meu gosto...gosto delas com a pele mais imaculada.