Agências de viagens acusam Bruxelas de ceder a lobby das companhias aéreas

[Karamba]

O 2º semestre de 2002, em termos de mercados financeiros, mais do que o bear market do mercado accionista (interminável, e que já quase nem é notícia), ficou sobretudo marcado pela forte correcção do usd, e da forte determinação por parte do FED em banir a tendência deflacionista.
O último coelho a saltar da cartola do "Mister" foi o posicionamento das fed funds abaixo da taxa de inflação, e um discurso de "bota a baixo o dólar".

O usd tem todas as condições para continuar a cair. Não estou a ver é como se vai portar o mercado de dívida americano, sem procura por parte dos europeus, e não só.

O fed tem todo o interesse em manipular a zona longa da yield curve por forma a manter as taxas de longo prazo a níveis baixos. Yields baixas, usd em queda, será que os chineses sózinhos dão resposta às necessidades de financiamento dos states. Puzzling !
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Stephen Li Jen (London)



In 2003 and into 2004, I believe currency markets will see significantly more volatility. I believe that the US economy has a good chance of establishing a bottom in 2003, and that this will mark a resumption of the US dollar downtrend against the yen, the euro, and emerging market currencies.

The US Dollar Story Is Not Straightforward

My view on the dollar is that it is grossly overvalued, but I would caution against indiscriminately betting against the currency. In my view, as long as economic "double-dip" concerns linger (fuelled by weak reads on the global economy), global fear-motivated capital should continue to find shelter in dollar bonds, thereby supporting the currency. In other words, the dollar will correct only in a more "benign’ global environment, once the US economy has bottomed out.

This argument very much reflects Asian investors’ preference for the dollar as a safe haven in times of fear. Under this thinking, the dollar can correct only when Asian investors stop sending money to the US, which, in turn, can happen only if the US and Asian economies themselves stabilize. Only when the US economy bottoms out can Asian investors justify investing in local economies leveraged to US growth, to capitalize on the impending US economic recovery.

I believe that China in particular plays a role in supporting the dollar, through its dollar peg. Most foreign direct investment and other capital inflows to the country come, and stay, in dollars. China’s becoming a viable destination of investment has helped support global demand for dollars, in my view.

The "Texture" of the Dollar Correction

A bottoming in the US economy and US bond yields will mark the peak in the dollar index, in my view, but it is important to consider the "texture" — that is, the magnitude, symmetry, and speed — of this prospective correction.

· Magnitude. I believe that, by 2003, the dollar will be 15–20% overvalued, but the less vigorous the recovery, the less the currency will sell off. Assuming that, after bottoming out, the US and the global economies undergo a protracted sub-trend growth period, the magnitude of the dollar correction is likely to be meaningful, but limited, in my view. First, with weak global demand, it is difficult to imagine any economy pursuing a strong currency policy. Outright intervention by Japan to support the dollar cannot be ruled out, and verbal intervention to cap EUR/USD should be expected if the global economy remains weak. Second, the shallow trajectory of demand growth in a tepid recovery should temper the flow of US bonds into emerging markets.

· Symmetry. I believe this prospective dollar correction will be relatively symmetric against the euro, yen, and emerging market currencies. Experience from the past two episodes of major dollar adjustments (1985–88 and 1995–97) indicates that, when the dollar corrects, it moves most violently against the yen. Even tempering this historical regularity by Japan’s weak economy, this still suggests that the yen is likely to perform at least as well as the euro in a dollar correction. Moreover, as the US economy stabilizes, Japan’s external sector should stabilize too and support the yen. The same logic applies to emerging markets: they often rely on the vigor of real demand from the US, but also on normalized tolerance for risk.

· Speed. I maintain my belief that a hard dollar crash is not possible. A dollar crash would be the same as a renminbi crash. Ceteris paribus, this would lead to a huge withdrawal of external demand from the US and a large injection of supply from China into the global economy. The combination would be very deflationary. In my view, this will not be permitted by the global economy, and the dollar’s descent will be gradual.

Developments in Japan

The yen is also likely to be influenced by two Japan-specific factors: the pace of reform and the strength of the economy. I expect reforms to advance only gradually due to the weak economic backdrop. This will probably allow the dollar to correct against the yen next year. The Bank of Japan’s efforts in hydrating the Japanese economy are unlikely to drive USD/JPY higher, in my view. Notwithstanding occasional blips in USD/JPY, I believe that the structural negatives of the dollar will dominate in the end, and that USD/JPY will trade down toward 118 by the end of 2003 and 112 by the end of 2004.

EUR/USD: Weak Rally by Default, Not by Merit

Euroland has serious structural problems. The rally in EUR/USD continues to be by default, not by merit, in my opinion. These structural problems are likely to temper the magnitude and pace of the rally. I am looking for 1.08 by the end of 2003 and 1.12 by the end of 2004.