Negociação coletiva garante até seis semanas de férias por ano

[EuroVerde]

<iframe title="YouTube video player" width="480" height="390" src="http://www.youtube.com/embed/QQ2nKxkGy4s" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen></iframe>

[EuroVerde]

Afinal já vai em 160, sempre não atingiu os 115 da compra do Buffett

[ambgoncalves]

Goldman Sachs Loses Room to Maneuver After Public Testimony

By Joshua Gallu

May 1 (Bloomberg) -- Goldman Sachs Group Inc. may have backed itself into a corner by speaking out quickly to counter fraud claims by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

In the two weeks since the SEC filed its lawsuit, Goldman Sachs has released multiple written defenses, sent executives to Capitol Hill for sworn testimony and put Chief Executive Officer Lloyd Blankfein on television to explain the firm’s conduct as the housing market soured. While broadcasting its story, the New York investment bank also has given regulators, lawmakers and law enforcement agencies material to scour for contradictions that could weaken its defense.

SEC attorneys are already poring through the April 27 Senate testimony of Fabrice Tourre, the 31-year-old banker at the center of the lawsuit, looking for any deviation from sworn statements he made during the agency’s investigation, according to a person familiar with the probe who declined to be identified because the matter isn’t public.

“Going under oath and committing yourself before you have any idea what kind of a case might be brought against you -- and more particularly what the evidence in that case might be -- is going to seriously curtail a defense lawyer’s ability to find running room to defend you,” said Samuel Buell, a former federal prosecutor who is now a law professor at Washington University in St. Louis.

Before the hearing, Tourre and Blankfein, 55, were interviewed under oath by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Senator Carl Levin, the Michigan Democrat who heads the panel, said he’s looking into whether they “tried to fudge” their responses in the public hearing this week. Blankfein will appear next week at the annual shareholders meeting to answer questions related to the lawsuit.

Goldman Sachs declined to comment for this story.

Khuzami Meeting

Robert Khuzami, the SEC’s chief of enforcement, said in a closed meeting with Congressional staff on April 29 that it wouldn’t be appropriate to discuss whether there are settlement talks taking place, according to one person who attended and spoke on condition of anonymity because the briefing was private. Khuzami also declined to comment on why Tourre was the only individual named in the lawsuit, the person said.

The SEC’s April 16 lawsuit revolves around whether the firm should have told investors in 2007 that hedge fund Paulson & Co., helped pick the underlying securities for a collateralized debt obligation -- and then bet against it. Paulson wasn’t accused of any wrongdoing.

Goldman Sachs’s Strategy

While locking in testimony this early in the litigation process posed risks, it was part of Goldman Sachs’s strategy, according to a person with direct knowledge of the firm’s defense. Tourre’s public statements make it less likely that he could change his story later and negotiate a lesser penalty with the SEC in return for information that could be damaging to the firm or other executives, the person said.

Tourre, whose legal fees are paid by Goldman Sachs, said he “categorically” denies the SEC’s allegations. He may have testified to save his reputation and career, Buell said.

“These guys’ considerations aren’t just legal,” said Buell. “They have to do with public relations, with reputation, with their ability to continue to function the way they want to in the business world.”

Goldman Sachs’s stock dropped 13 percent on the day the SEC announced its case and declined 9.4 percent yesterday after reports that federal prosecutors in New York are investigating the matter to determine whether to pursue a criminal fraud case.

Along with two analyst downgrades, the scrutiny “puts the pressure” on Goldman Sachs to try to settle sooner rather than later, Matt McCormick, an analyst at Bahl & Gaynor Inc. in Cincinnati, which manages about $2.8 billion, said yesterday in a Bloomberg Television interview.

In terms of public opinion, McCormick said, Goldman Sachs has “already been condemned, the question is the price.”

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=avI7OhdudjWc&pos=1#

[Ulisses Pereira]

"Why Goldman Sachs Is in Deep Trouble"

By Jim Cramer
RealMoney Columnist
4/26/2010 7:00 AM EDT

"Throughout this last week we learned repeatedly about the holes in the government's case against Goldman Sachs (GS - commentary - Trade Now), holes that would make you think that the government shouldn't have sued the company to begin with.

We know that the emails were taken out of context, that Goldman lost a lot of money in mortgages, including $90 million on the synthetic CDO that's the focus of the government's case, that ACA Capital played a much bigger role in the selection of mortgages than hedge fund Paulson & Co. did and that Goldman didn't create anything it expected to fail because internally the firm was split on the health of the market.

But we are about stocks, not law, and by the end of the week Goldman's stock finished well below where it was when the news broke, and another four points down for the week. Clearly, if any of this mattered to the company or its fortunes in the case, the stock would have begun to regain some of its ground, particularly given that Goldman reported a shoot-the-lights-out quarter and got the benefit of kind words from large shareholder Warren Buffett.

So, if the case is so bad, why isn't the stock going higher?

I think it's because of a recognition by the marketplace that as long as the case isn't frivolous, Goldman remains in deep trouble. Even though two out of five Securities and Exchange Commission commissioners chose not to vote in favor of charging Goldman with fraud, it is hard to argue that the case is frivolous.

There is enough evidence for someone to think that Goldman Sachs may not have been kosher in the way it marketed this faulty product, and that makes it reasonable to think that the government's case deserves a full hearing.

More important, though, is if the case is so weak, then why isn't the SEC eager to settle, and why didn't Goldman try hard to do so, given that the fallout could be so great? In other words, why isn't the Commission more worried about losing? And why didn't Goldman say, "Look, we don't think your case can hold up in court, so let's figure out a way we can all live with each other"? Why did Goldman Sachs go so scorched-earth so quickly?


I think because the Commission is so under the gun after the beating it took from Judge Rakoff on the Bank of America (BAC - commentary - Trade Now) settlement, that it has little desire to settle. We don't know this, but I believe the commission would not accept a settlement unless Goldman admitted to abetting intentional fraud, which would open up gigantic civil damages.

If that's the case, it pretty much didn't matter what Goldman said or did or says and does. The case will go to a jury where the SEC's line -- that Goldman created a product that was meant to fail -- will prevail, because no jury is in the mood to find for Goldman and the defendant is about as unsympathetic as you can find in this country.

Still, there are and have been so many tactical mistakes made by Goldman that I think that no matter what happens, Goldman's a huge loser, again, something the stock is saying loud and clear.

For example:


The company's lawyers have really killed Goldman. They paid no attention to the state of play of the SEC's thinking. Goldman's lawyers knew that an enforcement action was contemplated. How could they not be on top of this? It is outrageous that Goldman Sachs was "surprised" that this action was brought. You pay your lawyers millions of dollars just so this doesn't happen. It's incredible to me how badly Goldman and its law firm, Sullivan & Cromwell, botched the SEC's state of play. Unforgiveable. Surprised. How about, "We screwed up and didn't do our jobs."?

The company knew it was going to get sued. How could it not have its public relations machine ready? How did it let the government dominate in those first 48 hours so that everyone in America knew that the government was good and Goldman was a bad actor. Goldman lost that battle that Friday and has not been able to catch up since.

Goldman was arrogant and ideological in thinking that it did nothing wrong so it didn't have to settle. Right and wrong are irrelevant when dealing with a government agency in this toxic environment. There is always a way to settle (even if the government wanted some intent, there is a way to finagle the fraud charge so the franchise is preserved). Judging by everything we have read it just doesn't seem Goldman tried hard enough to reach a settlement. It should have worked harder.

Goldman doesn't seem to have its facts right. Did it invest by choice in this Abacus deal, which is what the company is making it sound like, or did Goldman just get hung and couldn't sell it? We don't know. But don't put it out there unless you tell us that you chose to invest in it, which we don't know.

Why did Goldman not disclose the Wells notice in the first place? It was most certainly material. Where were the lawyers on this? There is no two ways on this. There is no reasonable argument that it was not material as Goldman's business is based on trust and confidence, and hiding the Wells notice is the equivalent of deceit.

Did Goldman CEO Lloyd Blankfein know all about this when he testified in front of the Angelides Commission? Did he bag that commission?

Did Goldman Sachs ever consult its board on this, or has management been freelancing? I think management has been flying solo.

All of these questions might be irrelevant if the government simply had decided it wouldn't settle no matter what. But I don't believe that -- not with two commissioners voting against the charges. I think that Goldman Sachs has now created a situation where it can only settle by agreeing to pay a multibillion-dollar fine, certainly the largest ever paid, and perhaps by agreeing to having some of its top executives step down. That's how badly I think Goldman has handled this. The reputational damage is so great already that even if Goldman gets a favorable settlement the tarnish is just horrific.

Which is why last Sunday I wrote that I thought Goldman Sachs will lose this case no matter how many things come out about how badly thought-out the government's case is.

Only this time I believe that maybe, after all of these mistakes, the punishment is more fitting, even if the case is less solid than I thought a week ago.

And that's why Goldman's stock didn't rally. I think Goldman and its lawyers have made nothing but wrong moves since the Wells submission, and those moves, not the government's case, explain why the stock can't and won't rally.

At the time of publication, Cramer was long Bank of America and Goldman Sachs. "

(in www.realmoney.com)

[EuroVerde]

Deixo um gráfico com o momento da compra de Warren Buffett e o momento actual que dizem que vai cair com rumores de tal e tal.

[LTCM]

Saqueadores sofisticados
por Paul Krugman, Publicado em 23 de Abril de 2010
A criação de produtos financeiros com a intenção de os fazer cair mais tarde, agora associada ao Goldman, não fez a crise mas agravou-a. A reforma do sector tem de impedir este tipo de fraude
Em Outubro passado vi uma banda-desenhada de Mike Petersin em que um professor pedia a um aluno que construísse uma frase contendo o tempo verbal "sacks", de saquear, pilhar. O aluno respondeu: "Goldman Sachs."

Nem de propósito, a semana passada, a Securities and Exchange Commission acusou os elegantes tipos da Goldman de praticarem o que não passa de saques de colarinho branco.

Estou a usar o termo "saque" no sentido que lhe atribuem os economistas George Akerlof e Paul Romer num relatório de 1993 intitulado "Looting: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit". Esse documento, escrito no período que se seguiu à crise dos bancos comerciais, os savings and loans, da era Reagan, afirmava que muitas das perdas ocorridas nessa crise resultavam de fraude deliberada. Passar-se-á o mesmo com a actual crise financeira?

A maioria dos debates acerca do papel da fraude na presente crise tem-se centrado em dois tipos de impostura: os empréstimos predatórios e a comunicação incorrecta dos riscos. Não há dúvida que muitas pessoas foram convencidas a contrair empréstimos complexos e dispendiosos cujas implicações não compreendiam - um processo facilitado pela actuação dos reguladores federais da era Bush, que, por um lado, não conteve a concessão abusiva de empréstimos e, por outro, impediu os estados de tomarem medidas próprias. Em larga medida, quem concedia empréstimos subprime não ficou com o correspondente título de dívida na mão. Em vez disso, vendeu os empréstimos a investidores, em alguns casos não podendo deixar de saber que o potencial de perdas futuras era maior do que imaginavam as pessoas que compravam esses empréstimos (ou títulos cobertos por tais empréstimos).

Aquilo a que agora estamos a assistir são acusações de um terceiro tipo de fraude.

Há muito que sabemos que o Goldman Sachs e outras instituições similares comercializavam títulos cobertos por hipotecas, apesar de procurarem obter lucros apostando que o valor desses mesmos títulos iria cair. Todavia, essa prática, embora moralmente condenável, não era ilegal. Mas agora a SEC está a acusar o Goldman de ter criado e comercializado títulos deliberadamente concebidos para caírem, de modo que um cliente importante pudesse lucrar com essa queda. Ora a isso eu chamo saque.

E o Goldman não é a única instituição financeira a ser acusada de o fazer. De acordo com o website de jornalismo de investigação ProPublica, detentor de um prémio Pulitzer, vários bancos ajudaram a comercializar investimentos destinados ao fracasso por conta do hedge fund Magnetar, que apostava nesse fracasso.

Então qual o papel da fraude na crise financeira? Não foram os empréstimos predatórios nem a venda de hipotecas com falsas expectativas que causaram a crise. Mas não há dúvida que a agravaram, quer por terem ajudado a inflacionar a bolha imobiliária, quer por terem criado um conjunto de activos que se transformariam inapelavelmente em bens tóxicos assim que a bolha rebentasse.

Quanto à alegada criação de investimentos destinados a caírem, é possível que tenham ampliado as perdas dos bancos que estavam do lado perdedor desses negócios, agravando a crise bancária que transformou a bolha imobiliária numa catástrofe que atingiu a totalidade da economia.

A questão fulcral é saber se uma reforma financeira como a que está presentemente a ser debatida poderia evitar, no todo ou em parte, esse tipo de fraude que parece ter prosperado na última década. E a resposta é afirmativa.

Antes de mais, a existência de um organismo independente de protecção do consumidor poderia limitar os empréstimos predatórios. Outra disposição da proposta de lei do Senado, que exige que os credores retenham 5% do valor dos empréstimos que concedem, limitaria a prática de conceder empréstimos tóxicos e vendê-los rapidamente a investidores desavisados.

Já não é tão claro que as propostas para a reforma dos produtos derivados - que envolve sobretudo a exigência de instrumentos financeiros como os credit default swaps serem transaccionados abertamente e com transparência, como se de vulgares acções e títulos se tratasse - evitariam os alegados abusos do Goldman (embora, provavelmente, evitassem que a seguradora AIG se desmoronasse e pedisse um resgate federal). O que se pode dizer com certeza é que a redacção final da reforma financeira deve ser de molde a evitar este tipo de saques - em particular, deve bloquear a criação de "CDO sintéticos" [obrigações de dívida com colateral], cocktails de credit default swaps que permitem que os investidores apostem fortemente em activos que não são de facto propriedade sua.

Todavia, a principal lição moral a extrair das acusações feitas ao Goldman não tem a ver com as minúcias da reforma; tem a ver, sim, com a necessidade urgente de mudar Wall Street. A crer nos grupos de pressão do sector financeiro e nos políticos do Partido Republicano que têm andado de conluio com eles, poder-se-ia pensar que tudo ficará resolvido desde que o governo federal prometa não resgatar mais nenhuma empresa. Mas isso é completamente errado - e não só porque tal promessa não seria credível.

A questão está no facto de grande parte do sector financeiro se ter tornado uma máfia, um jogo em que um punhado de pessoas têm salários principescos para enganarem e explorarem os consumidores e os investidores. E se não pusermos um travão a essas práticas essa máfia sobreviverá.

Economista Nobel 2008

Exclusivo i/The New York Times

[LTCM]

e, se avancarem com esse tipo de argumentação, também concordo com o outro comentário:

“Under theories of vicarious liability, if you can find Tourre liable, it’s going to be hard for Goldman to escape.” .

Pata-Hari, eles só precisam de ter um bode expiatório. E já compuseram um. Se a SEC não vier a acreditar, na versão da Goldman Sachs (GS), problema da SEC.

Goste-se ou não, eu detesto, a GS tem mais “poder” que a SEC.

[Pata-Hari]

e, se avancarem com esse tipo de argumentação, também concordo com o outro comentário:

“Under theories of vicarious liability, if you can find Tourre liable, it’s going to be hard for Goldman to escape.” .

[Pata-Hari]

Byron Georgiou, a member of a U.S. panel that’s investigating the financial crisis, said he doubts Goldman Sachs could make a convincing case that Tourre acted alone and without the full support of his superiors.

“It’s hard to imagine that there wasn’t some supervision of a 27-year-old, at that time, trader structuring a billion- dollar transaction on which Goldman made a $15 million fee,” Georgiou, who serves on the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, said in a Bloomberg Television interview.

Exacto. Não sei que raio de estrutura a goldman teria que ter para isso ser possível.

[LTCM]

By Christine Harper and David Scheer

April 21 (Bloomberg) -- Goldman Sachs Group Inc. said the U.S. fraud case against the firm hinges on the actions of the employee it placed on paid leave this week.

Fabrice Tourre, the 31-year-old Goldman Sachs executive director who was accused of misleading investors about a mortgage-linked investment in 2007, will also be de-registered from the Financial Services Authority, a spokeswoman at the firm in London said yesterday.

“It’s all going to be a factual dispute about what he remembers and what the other folks remember on the other side,” Greg Palm, Goldman Sachs’s co-general counsel, said in a call with reporters yesterday, without naming Tourre. “If we had evidence that someone here was trying to mislead someone, that’s not something we’d condone at all and we’d be the first one to take action.”

By characterizing the case as a dispute involving a single employee, Goldman Sachs may be taking its first steps to publically distance itself from Tourre in the case, some lawyers said. That could reduce bad publicity and ultimately make it easier for the company to settle the case.

Goldman Sachs may also want to separate itself from Tourre if it’s concerned he will cooperate with the SEC or implicate more senior employees, said Onnig Dombalagian, a professor at Tulane University Law School in New Orleans and former attorney fellow at the SEC.

‘Vicarious Liability’

“If Tourre says, ‘Goldman’s board knew what we were doing,’ you can imagine Goldman will want to portray him as disgruntled,” or willing to lie to avoid punishment, the professor said. That may not help the firm itself, he added. “Under theories of vicarious liability, if you can find Tourre liable, it’s going to be hard for Goldman to escape.”

Pamela Chepiga, a lawyer for Tourre at Allen & Overy LLP in New York, didn’t return a call seeking comment. The New York- based bank has previously denied wrongdoing and said it will fight the SEC’s case because it is “completely unfounded in law and fact.”

The SEC sued Goldman Sachs and Tourre for misleading two investors in a collateralized debt obligation about the role played by hedge fund Paulson & Co. ACA Management LLC, which served as the CDO’s selection agent, didn’t realize that Paulson planned to bet against the deal even though the fund was advising ACA on the portfolio, the SEC alleged. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, an investor in the CDO, didn’t know about Paulson’s role at all, the SEC said.

‘He Said-She said’

The SEC complaint “clearly revolves a little bit around ‘he said-she said,’ ” Palm said, and hinges on whether Tourre misled ACA into believing that Paulson was investing in the deal instead of betting against it.

Byron Georgiou, a member of a U.S. panel that’s investigating the financial crisis, said he doubts Goldman Sachs could make a convincing case that Tourre acted alone and without the full support of his superiors.

“It’s hard to imagine that there wasn’t some supervision of a 27-year-old, at that time, trader structuring a billion- dollar transaction on which Goldman made a $15 million fee,” Georgiou, who serves on the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, said in a Bloomberg Television interview.

Palm said Tourre “believes that he indicated” to ACA that Paulson was interested in taking a “short” position on the deal, meaning he was betting against it, Palm said. “Our employee certainly knows that he did not represent to ACA or indicate in any way that Paulson was going to be an equity investor in this transaction.”

Goldman Sachs, which vowed on April 16 that it would “vigorously contest” the SEC’s suit, isn’t ruling out a potential settlement, Palm said.

“You go to trial, which is what we’re doing, and you always have the option of, if there is an agreeable settlement to both sides, of settling at any point in time,” he said.

[Ulisses Pereira]

Euroverde, mas alguém disse que a GS estava num Bear Market?

A queda teve a ver com a notícia, a notícia é que não tem a ver com a queda

Eu devo ser muito burro, mas continuei sem preceber o que querias dizer...

[EuroVerde]

Digo que a GS está simplesmente numa normal correcção das últimas valorizações e não no começo de um bear Market.
A queda teve a ver com a notícia, a notícia é que não tem a ver com a queda porque não temos que arranjar justificação para todos os movimentos do mercado.
Simplesmente não vejo a cotação abaixo de 115dolar, nem vejo a GS a ser um alvo que justifique o despoletar dum começo dum novo bear market...

arrangem-me outra, que esta não serve.

[LTCM]

[b] before the weaker numbers and the Goldman investigation got in the way.

Como gosto de teorias da conspiração:

Wonder how many shorts GS had this morning knowing the announcment would be released? I'm sure enough to pay the SEC fine.

[pedro200]

GS apresentou bons resultados....

[Ulrich]

Viva,

Cramer:

"That played out again Friday and Monday"

De facto esta frase é um ultra-condensado da "psicologia na actuação" inerente aos mercados globais no presente.

Estas são as regras, e quem for a jogo tem de as ter, sinceramente, interiorizadas.

Eu, pessoalmente não concordo, mas este é o mundo em que vamos continuar a "crescer".

Um abraço

[Ulisses Pereira]

"The Gloom Departs"

By Jim Cramer
RealMoney Columnist
4/20/2010 6:26 AM EDT


Friday's selloff may have done it again. Think about what you heard after the Goldman Sachs (GS - commentary - Trade Now) news: The public will think, again, that the game is rigged, now rigged more than ever, and the government is anti-business, deservedly, because the markets can't be trusted. Plus, Google (GOOG - commentary - Trade Now) and Advanced Micro Devices (AMD - commentary - Trade Now) were "bad" meaning that tech and semiconductors in particular had moved up too much and were headed back to more realistic levels.

Most of all you got a sense of the market's "fragility" as no one would come on and say "time to buy." No one. My mailbox was full of end-of-the-world submissions; palpable hatred was back.

Sure enough, when the market opened and didn't get clocked there was a wave of put-buying from about 10:15 a.m. to 2 p.m. that took my breath away. The mass purchase of puts on just about everything was outrageous, and the put premiums staggering. The freefall of tech, spurred on by nothing in particular Monday, also shocked, with the Nasdaq at one point looking like it was going to roll back a gigantic move.

By 2 p.m. it seemed that the market was just hanging on by a thread.

Then the split Securities and Exchange Commission opinion came out about Goldman and the gloom parted. Suddenly people were buying drillers off of Halliburton's (HAL - commentary - Trade Now) comments -- they were selling them before -- and they were buying transports off the lessening of the volcano plume -- they were selling them before. The tech stories that were being pummeled -- networkers and chips -- got bought.

And the bank sellers disappeared. The put-buyers of Goldman Sachs saw their premiums erode even faster than the common stock ran up and a mini short-squeeze ensued. Citigroup (C - commentary - Trade Now) regained its footing and now has a bead on five, which I think it can blitz through.

In other words, the pessimism that lurks underneath exploded outward after the Friday Goldman news, and after furious bets were made on the short side, there was no follow-through at all.

In a market that has defied the bears we have repeatedly seen events that were perceived to be bull killers. We have then seen the scared bulls turned to bears and dump stock and the real bears fly in to buy huge amounts of puts.

That played out again Friday and Monday.

And it sets us up nice for a run if the earnings today are as good as those we got last Tuesday and Wednesday before the weaker numbers and the Goldman investigation got in the way.

Random musings: The U.K. plans to investigate Goldman and will be working closely with the SEC in its probe.

At the time of publication, Cramer was long Goldman Sachs. "

(in www.realmoney.com)

[Pata-Hari]

parece que a Goldman comprou parte do produto montado para clientes (o lado oposto ao Paulson), da parte que perdeu dinheiro. Vai ser dificil provar que tendo perdido dinheiro, que o fez de má fé ou maliciosamente.

[torgeist]

Só quem não sabe o que é a Goldman Sachs e o que ela representa para a economia e principalmente para os interesses dos EUA é que pode pensar que essa instituição pode alguma vez falir...

É uma instituição que está sujeita à Lei como todas as outras e, obviamente, ao cumprimento das "regras do jogo", não obstante muitas dessas regras e muitas outras decisões políticas serem feitas/tomadas à sua medida.

[MatildeSerrano]

Andam agora com rodeios por causa do que a Goldman Sachs fez. Este é um banco que não pode falir nem prejudicar perdas avultadas no resto do mercado simplesmente porque é um banco gerido por pessoas sérias e tem uma economia a trabalhar em seu favor (com ou sem crise) em que o Buffett investiu 400000000000dolar!
Se ele cai -14% isso devido a uma correcção.

Um banco que não pode falir ?
Porque é um banco gerido por pessoas sérias ??
E porque o Buffet investiu significa que a sua cotação não pode cair nem falir ???

[Ulisses Pereira]

Euroverde, então tu achas que a queda de mais de 10% da GS na Sexta-feira passada nada teve a ver com a notícia saída?

Um abraço,
Ulisses

[Bull Bull]

Andam agora com rodeios por causa do que a Goldman Sachs fez. Este é um banco que não pode falir nem prejudicar perdas avultadas no resto do mercado simplesmente porque é um banco gerido por pessoas sérias e tem uma economia a trabalhar em seu favor (com ou sem crise) em que o Buffett investiu 400000000000dolar!
Se ele cai -14% isso devido a uma correcção.

Olá euro Verde, existe alguma empresa que não possa falir? Fiquei algo confuso

[EuroVerde]

Andam agora com rodeios por causa do que a Goldman Sachs fez. Este é um banco que não pode falir nem prejudicar perdas avultadas no resto do mercado simplesmente porque é um banco gerido por pessoas sérias e tem uma economia a trabalhar em seu favor (com ou sem crise) em que o Buffett investiu 400000000000dolar!
Se ele cai -14% isso devido a uma correcção.

[Zecatreca_1001]

O processo conheceu alguns avanços na última semana, de forma a que tudo fique de acordo com o exigido pela CMVM. Espero ser mesmo apenas uma questão de tempo agora.

Um abraço,
Ulisses

Ok. Ansioso por esses comentarios. Espero que sejam ainda melhores do que no poker e com mais acertos
Abraço

[Bull Bull]

Boa tarde Ulisses.
Gostava de saber quando vais voltar ás tuas analises/comentarios.
Está demorado...
Um abraço

Zeca, não sabes que estamos em Portugal e que tudo leva o seu tempo, que por outras palavras, imenso

[Ulisses Pereira]

O processo conheceu alguns avanços na última semana, de forma a que tudo fique de acordo com o exigido pela CMVM. Espero ser mesmo apenas uma questão de tempo agora.

Um abraço,
Ulisses