CALDEIRÃO DE BOLSA

Ulisses Pereira Escreveu:O artigo é de 2011.

Caro Livermore, não deve ter lido o artigo, só mesmo o título. A hipótese colocada no artigo para salvar o Euro verificou-se mesmo e a m+aquina de fazer dinheiro entrou mesmo em acção. Às vezes ler só os títulos dá nisso...

5640533 Escreveu:

Ulisses Pereira Escreveu:Foi hoje publicado o meu novo artigo " O último suspiro do Euro": http://www.jornaldenegocios.pt/home.php ... &id=520741

Um abraço,
Ulisses

Sr. Ulisses, boa tarde. Este link não me leva ao seu artigo. Tentei outras maneiras de chegar ao artigo, mas não me aparece em lado nenhum. O que se Passa? Onde está o artigo? Obrigada.

Ulisses Pereira Escreveu:Foi hoje publicado o meu novo artigo " O último suspiro do Euro": http://www.jornaldenegocios.pt/home.php ... &id=520741

Um abraço,
Ulisses

Ulisses Pereira Escreveu:Foi hoje publicado o meu novo artigo " O último suspiro do Euro": http://www.jornaldenegocios.pt/home.php ... &id=520741

Um abraço,
Ulisses

The Disastrous Consequences of a Euro Crash

As the debt crisis worsens in Spain and Italy, financial experts are warning of the catastrophic consequences of a crash of the euro: the destruction of trillions in assets and record high unemployment levels, even in Germany. By SPIEGEL Staff


It wasn't long ago that Mario Draghi was spreading confidence and good cheer. "The worst is over," the head of the European Central Bank (ECB) told Germany's Bild newspaper only a few weeks ago. The situation in the euro zone had "stabilized," Draghi said, and "investor confidence was returning." And because everything seemed to be on track, Draghi even accepted a Prussian spiked helmet from the reporters. Hurrah.

Last week, however, Europe's chief monetary watchdog wasn't looking nearly as happy in photos taken in front of a circle of blue-and-yellow stars inside the Euro Tower, the ECB's Frankfurt headquarters, where he was congratulating the winners of an international student contest. He smiled, shook hands and handed out certificates. But what he had to tell his listeners no longer sounded optimistic. Instead, Draghi sounded deeply concerned and even displayed a touch of resignation. "You are the first generation that has grown up with the euro and is no longer familiar with the old currencies," he said. "I hope we won't experience them again."

The fact that Europe's top central banker is no longer willing to rule out a return to the old national currencies shows how serious the situation is. Until recently, it was seen as a sign of political correctness to not even consider the possibility of a euro collapse. But now that the currency dispute has escalated in Europe, the inconceivable is becoming conceivable, at all levels of politics and the economy.

Collapse of Currency a 'Very Likely Scenario'

Investment experts at Deutsche Bank now feel that a collapse of the common currency is "a very likely scenario." German companies are preparing themselves for the possibility that their business contacts in Madrid and Barcelona could soon be paying with pesetas again. And in Italy, former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi is thinking of running a new election campaign, possibly this year, on a return-to-the-lira platform.

Nothing seems impossible anymore, not even a scenario in which all members of the currency zone dust off their old coins and bills -- bidding farewell to the euro, and instead welcoming back the guilder, deutsche mark and drachma.

It would be a dream for nationalist politicians, and a nightmare for the economy. Everything that has grown together in two decades of euro history would have to be painstakingly torn apart. Millions of contracts, business relationships and partnerships would have to be reassessed, while thousands of companies would need protection from bankruptcy. All of Europe would plunge into a deep recession. Governments, which would be forced to borrow additional billions to meet their needs, would face the choice between two unattractive options: either to drastically increase taxes or to impose significant financial burdens on their citizens in the form of higher inflation.

A horrific scenario would become a reality, a prospect so frightening that it ought to convince every European leader to seek a consensus as quickly as possible. But there can be no talk of consensus today. On the contrary, as the economic crisis worsens in southern Europe, the fronts between governments are only becoming more rigid.

The Italians and Spaniards want Germany to issue stronger guarantees for their debts. But the Germans are only willing to do so if all euro countries transfer more power to Brussels -- steps the southern member states, for their part, don't want to take.

The Patient Is Getting Worse

The discussion has been going in circles for months, which is why the continent's debtor countries continue to squander confidence, among both the international financial markets and their citizens. No matter what medicine European politicians prescribe, the patient isn't getting any better. In fact, it's only getting worse.

For weeks, investors and experts demanded a solution to the Spanish banking crisis, preferably in the form of a cash infusion from the two Luxembourg-based European bailout funds, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). When Madrid finally decided to request what could ultimately amount to almost €100 billion ($125 billion), the experts realized that this would suddenly send Spain's government debt shooting up from 70 to 80 percent. As a result, interest rates started rising instead of falling.

The experience of the last few days describes the entire dilemma faced by European politicians trying to rescue the euro: A step that was intended to provide relief only exacerbated the problem.

The same thing happened with the next proposal, which made the rounds last week. Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti wanted the European bailout funds to intervene on behalf of Spain and Italy to bring down their borrowing costs.

But that would have required the affected countries to submit to a program of reforms, a path Monti and his Spanish counterpart, Mariano Rajoy, want to avoid. They would prefer to have the money without conditions. But the German government is unwilling to accept this, which puts Europe at its next impasse. Furthermore, the rescue strategists' resources are limited. Although the Luxembourg bailout funds still have more than €600 billion in uncommitted resources, it is already clear that the money would be used up quickly if what many experts now believe is unavoidable came to pass, namely that not just the Spanish banking industry but in fact the entire country required a bailout. The bailout funds would be completely overtaxed if Italy also needed help.

Even ECB Has Largely Exhausted Resources

Until now, the defenders of the euro have been able to resort to the massive funds of the ECB, if necessary. If things got tight, the monetary watchdogs could inject new money into the market.

But now even the ECB has largely exhausted its resources. It has already bought up so much of the sovereign debt of ailing countries that any additional shopping spree threatens to backfire, causing interest rates to explode instead of fall. At the same time, the conflict between Northern and Southern Europe in the ECB Governing Council is heating up. Last week, the head of Spain's central bank managed to convince the ECB to ease its rules to allow Spanish banks to use even weaker collateral than before in exchange for borrowing money from the ECB. This could set off a tiff with the central bankers from the donor countries, who are loath to look on as the risks in the central bank's balance sheet continue to grow.

Indeed, the European leaders seeking to save the euro are in a race against the clock. The question is whether the economy in Southern Europe will recover before the euro rescuers' tools are exhausted, or whether it will be too late by the time the recovery arrives. It's a question of growth and the economy, but also of character. How willing are the Spaniards and Italians to accept reforms and hardship, and how willing, on the other hand, are the donor countries of the north to provide assistance and make sacrifices?

Not willing enough, say many experts. As a result, the world is imagining the unthinkable: the withdrawal of several Southern European countries from the monetary union, or possibly even the general collapse of the euro zone. It isn't easy to predict how such a tornado would affect the global economy, but it's clear that the damage would be immense.

Part1:
http://www.spiegel.de/international/eur ... 40634.html

Part 2: Companies Envision Possible Scenarios

It's also clear, says Hamburg economist Dirk Meyer, that the timetable for a euro exit in the affected countries would begin on a Monday, or "Day X." Over the weekend, the governments would have issued the surprising announcement that banks would remain closed on Monday. The bank holiday would be needed to include all savings and checking accounts in the operation.

On Tuesday, the banks and savings banks would begin stamping their customers' bank notes with forgery-proof ink. Capital transactions would be monitored. Black market prices would quickly develop in what the scenario defines as an "unofficial, virtual currency market." Another bank holiday would be needed to convert accounts and balances to the new currency. But at least another year would pass before new bank notes could be printed and distributed. The stamped euro banknotes would remain legal tender in the meantime.

But these are merely the technical consequences of a monetary reform. The economic consequences, which many German companies are now assessing, would be more serious. What happens if, in addition to Greece, other countries have to leave the euro zone? What will be the consequences if Spain, Portugal or Italy reintroduce their own currencies? Experts in the finance departments of some companies are already envisioning the possible scenarios.

For instance, they are examining whether the "euro" is explicitly defined as the agreement currency in contracts with customers from problem countries, so that they don't suddenly find themselves being paid in drachmas or escudos for their products. They are also looking into whether the costs incurred by a possible currency crash would be tax-deductible. And they are examining the potential need for write-offs if claims against business partners from southern countries are suddenly denominated in new currencies on their balance sheets. "The demand for consulting services has risen considerably in recent months," says Gunnar Schuster, an attorney with the law firm Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer.

Germany Would Be Hard Hit

Germany, the great exporting nation, would be especially hard hit by monetary reforms in the southern countries. Exports to Italy and Spain alone are valued at about €100 billion a year. Although sales of cars, machinery, electronics and optical devices would not be eliminated altogether in the event of a euro collapse, there would be sharp declines, because customers in Southern Europe could no longer afford German products.

As soon as lira or pesetas were in circulation once again, the currencies would be devalued against the euro. Some expect their value to decline by 20 to 25 percent, while others believe that as much as 40 percent is likely. German goods would automatically become more expensive and would hardly be competitive anymore.

When BMW CEO Norbert Reithofer warns that a collapse of the euro "would be a catastrophe," and says that he "doesn't even want to imagine" the possible consequences, he isn't just thinking about declining exports. Reithofer fears that regionalism could return to Europe, and that countries could reintroduce customs barriers to protect domestic industry. And the current uniform environment protection rules would be replaced by a large number of national regulations. All of this would plunge the German export economy into a crisis.

The consequences would be extensive for companies that don't just sell products to Southern Europe, but also maintain branches there or hold partnerships in local companies. The German industrial conglomerate ThyssenKrupp, for example, earns about €1.6 billion in revenues in Spain, where it also employs 5,500 people, mostly in elevator production. Even more important to the company is Italy, where it makes €2.3 billion a year, mostly with the production of stainless steel.

ThyssenKrupp's business in Italy and Spain makes up 9 percent of total sales, which illustrates the importance of the two countries in terms of profits. If a reintroduced lira and peseta were devalued against the euro, the amount of money that the subsidiaries transferred to the parent company in the western German city of Essen would shrink.

A look at the statistics of Germany's central bank, the Bundesbank, illustrates the amounts of money at stake for the economy. They show that in 2010, German companies achieved sales of about €218 billion in Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland and Cyprus, with Italian subsidiaries alone accounting for €96 billion. The value of foreign direct investment in these countries is about €90 billion.

German companies would also benefit from a euro crash, because labor costs would decline in their Portuguese or Spanish factories, but on balance the consequences would be negative. After the last appreciation of the currency in Germany, when the deutsche mark was flying high in the mid-1990s, the export economy suffered the consequences for years.

Massive Shock for Banking Sector

The effects of a euro crash on the financial sector would be hardly less devastating. If Southern European countries left the euro zone, customers would raid their accounts in those countries, says Christopher Kaserer, an expert on capital markets at the Technical University of Munich. This could lead to "a bank run that Spanish and Italian banks would not survive." And because financial companies in these countries are closely intertwined with the rest of the euro zone, customers would also be lining up in front of German banks. "Without capital controls, this sort of a situation could spin out of control," says Michael Kemmer, head of the Association of German Banks. Economists anticipate that German banks would also have to be closed.

But even if there were no major bank run, the withdrawal of several countries from the euro zone would shake the European banking system to its very foundations, analysts with the major Swiss bank Credit Suisse have calculated in a study.

According to the study, if Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy joined Greece in leaving the euro, 29 large European banks would see a total capital shortfall of about €410 billion. "If the peripheral countries withdraw from the euro zone, a few of the large, publicly traded banks would come to a standstill," reads the analysts' sobering conclusion. In their predictions, the experts did not even take into account the likelihood that France would come under pressure if Italy withdrew from the euro.

Banks in the crisis-ridden countries would be especially hard-hit, but so would investment banks like Deutsche Bank. According to Credit Suisse, the market leader in Europe's largest economy, which prides itself in having survived the financial crisis without government assistance, would face such heavy loses that it would suffer a capital shortfall of €35 billion.

Whereas Greece is now almost irrelevant for Deutsche Bank, Italy and Spain account for a tenth of its European private and corporate banking business. The bank estimates the credit risks in these countries at about €18 billion (Italy) and €12 billion (Spain).

Large insurance companies are also active in Spain and Italy. Allianz, for example, holds Italian government bonds with a book value of €31 billion, which could create losses for the German insurance giant if Italy withdrew from the euro and had trouble paying its debts. Allianz also holds direct investments in banks in debt-ridden Southern European countries.

Companies, sensing the potential risks, are already doing as much as they can today to prepare for a European monetary storm. For instance, they are financing deals in the peripheral countries locally, so as to avoid currency risk. Investment bankers report that companies are receiving loans almost exclusively from banks in their own countries. Where cross-border transactions are unavoidable, banks are engaging in hedge transactions. IT systems are being prepared for a Europe with multiple currencies. And whenever they can, banks are establishing liquidity reserves or depositing money with the ECB.

Part2.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/eur ... 634-2.html

Part 3: 'Consequences of Disaster Would Spread Like a Tidal Wave'


In the real economy, companies are also doing what they can to prepare for a worst-case scenario. If possible, they are only doing business in the crisis-ridden countries that they can finance locally. Investments in Southern Europe are being scaled back, and instead companies are trying "to accelerate growth outside the euro zone, such as in the emerging economies of Asia and Latin America," says one investment banker. This explains why mergers and acquisitions have virtually ground to a halt in Europe.

It's understandable that companies want to protect themselves from a euro crash. But if things get serious, all of these efforts could be worthless, because the consequences of a monetary disaster would spread across the entire economy like a tidal wave.

Economists with the Dutch bank ING have calculated that in the first two years following a collapse, the countries in the euro zone would lose 12 percent of their economic output. This corresponds to the loss of more than €1 trillion. It would make the recession that followed the bankruptcy of investment bank Lehmann Brothers seem like a minor industrial accident by comparison. Even after five years, say the ING experts, economic output in the euro zone would still be significantly lower than normal.

The consequences would also be catastrophic in Germany, as the German Finance Ministry concluded in a study commissioned by Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, a member of the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU). The recovery and economic miracle would abruptly come to an end, and instead banks and companies would start collapsing like dominoes, after having to write off receivables and investments.

The German Finance Ministry's prognosis is even grimmer than that of the ING experts. According to their scenarios, in the first year following a euro collapse, the German economy would shrink by up to 10 percent and the ranks of the unemployed would swell to more than 5 million people. The officials were so horrified by their conclusions that they kept all of their analyses under lock and key, for fear that the costs of rescuing the euro could spin out of control. "Compared to such scenarios, a rescue, no matter how expensive it is, seems to be the lesser evil," says one Finance Ministry official.

Costs of Crash for Germany Could Be More than €500 Billion

The dream of balanced budgets would be dead for years. Government debt would rise sharply as tax revenues declined and government spending, on everything from bank bailouts to unemployment insurance, increased. Hundreds of thousands of jobs could be outsourced to other countries, and thousands of companies could go under.

According to a scenario by the major Swiss bank UBS, if the financial risks resulting from the decline in exports, the necessary bank bailouts and the company bankruptcies are added together, the total cost to the German economy could amount to a quarter of Germany's gross domestic product -- well over €500 billion.

And this doesn't even reflect the biggest financial risk, which remains hidden. In the last two years, the ECB has bought up more than €200 billion in sovereign debt from crisis-ridden countries. It would have to write off some of that debt in the event of a euro crash, which would also spell losses for the ECB's largest shareholder, Germany's Bundesbank central bank.

The so-called Target2 balances pose another threat. Through this internal payment system in the euro zone, the Bundesbank has accumulated about €700 billion in claims against the central banks of countries like Greece, Spain and Italy. This is more than five times the Bundesbank's own capital.

"If the monetary union collapsed, these claims would turn into thin air," says Hans-Werner Sinn, head of the Munich-based Ifo Institute for Economic Research. "Then the Bundesbank would have to write off this amount." Given that central banks are not normal enterprises, though, Sinn's conclusion is debatable. This is because central banks have different accounting options. It is conceivable, for example, that the Bundesbank could replace the Target2 asset on its balance sheet with an equalization claim against the German national budget. This would balance the equation on paper.

As long ago as 1948, the Bank Deutscher Länder (Bank of the German States, the forerunner of the Bundesbank) resorted to this accounting trick when, for example, it gave every German citizen 40 deutsche marks following monetary reform. Some of these claims have been on the central bank's books for decades.

But this time the amounts in question are different. It will likely trigger skepticism among international trading partners if the central bank simply conjures the claims from the Target2 system out of its books. It would jeopardize the reputation of the bank's executive board members as stability oriented monetary watchdogs, and possibly even the image of the new currency.

A Conundrum for Investors

Not surprisingly, German depositors and investors are worried. What happens to their assets once the dust has settled and the euro zone has been replaced with a multitude of currencies in Europe once again?

In the short term, the prices of almost all even slightly risky securities would plunge, predicts Andrew Bosomworth. He runs the German portfolio management division of Allianz subsidiary PIMCO, one of the world's largest asset management firms. Should the euro collapse, which Bosomworth still considers unlikely, he expects investors to suffer losses for several reasons. "First, they would suffer currency losses with almost all securities that were converted back to national currencies following a euro withdrawal," says Bosomworth. "Second, they would have to expect countries and companies to default more frequently on their bonds."

Asset managers see only two ways to protect themselves against a crash of the euro zone: to invest the money in tangible assets or to get it out of Europe. "Investors should nationalize their investments, with a focus on emerging economies," advises Bosomworth.

German citizens haven't recognized yet what an abyss they are facing. If the euro collapses, not only will many people lose their livelihoods, but German retirement pensions will also be threatened. The economic success of the last few years would be destroyed, and Germany would fall back into the crisis status of the 1990s.

On the other hand, if the German government gave in to the Southern Europeans' pressure to communitize debt, the risks could even be greater. Instead of an uncontrolled euro crash, Germany could be confronted with an uncontrolled transfer union. Year after year, the Germans would have to transfer sums in the double-digit billions to Southern European countries.

Time Remains to Save Euro

The worst can still be prevented, and Europeans still have the ability to save their common currency without overtaxing the solidarity of the donor countries.

But it is a massive task. Europe's politicians must surrender power to Brussels to supplement their common currency with the political union that's been missing until now. At the same time, the Italians and the Spaniards would have to prove that they could successfully reform and modernize their economies.

So far, it has seemed as if the quarreling nations of the old continent would prove equal to the challenge, as has so often been the case in their postwar history. As experienced Brussels observers know, solutions are only reached in Europe when the continent has run out of options.

But apparently the euro crisis is now so dire that it could even sweep away the oldest European certainties. Even die-hard European politicians now believe that it is no longer inconceivable that the monetary union could soon have fewer members than before. "To push Europe forward, we have to reform the euro," says Luxembourg Finance Minister Luc Frieden. "This doesn't just apply to the management of the monetary union, but, if necessary, to its geographic composition, as well."

Part3:
http://www.spiegel.de/international/eur ... 634-3.html

djovarius Escreveu:Bom dia,

Vejo por aqui grande pessimismo.
Eu mantenho o que disse aqui há quase dez anos numa conversa a propósito do fim do dólar.
Nessa época, o EUR era tudo para os mercados e o USD visto como uma praga.
Pois já nesse tempo, "traders" concordavam que nem o dólar era para acabar, nem o EUR era viável da maneira em que estava assente, da maneira que foi concebido.
Agora, acho exagerado dizer-se que o EUR vai acabar. Muito exagerado e revelador de excessivo pessimismo.
O EUR continuará, ainda que diferente de hoje, ainda que seja a moeda de um grupo mais restrito de países.
Continuo a acreditar que uma espécie de EU da Europa é o que aí vem, ainda que por fases. O primeiro passo será seguramente uma maior integração da política fiscal. Quem assim não desejar (e estão no seu direito), arrisca-se a levar o cartão vermelho e ficar entregue "à bicharada", tendo de se valer por si, o que pode implicar um calote "selvagem" e a recuar muitos anos em termos económicos.

Quem quiser ficar, tem de repensar comportamentos e até pode beneficiar da ideia de um calote controlado, o que torna mais viável o objetivo de défices próximos a zero, condição essencial para a sustentabilidade de longo prazo das dívidas públicas.

Virão (e não "vai vir") tempos conturbados, mas deles é que se faz a História.

Abraço

dj

Ulisses Pereira Escreveu:Sim, TioPatinhas. A minha opinião neste artigo mantém-se. Ou seja, a menos que caminhemos para um federalismo, o euro não tem condições de sobreviver. Tenho dúvidas que se consiga caminhar para aí, mas neste acto de desespero está a tentar impor-se isso, à força. Duvido que resulte.

Um abraço,
Ulisses

Nyk Escreveu:Num outro artigo, também publicado este sábado, intitulado 'É realmente o fim', a The Economist escreve que, "mesmo com a zona euro a caminhar inevitavelmente para um crash, a maioria dos cidadãos assume que, no final, os líderes tomarão medidas para salvar o euro".

Ulisses Pereira Escreveu:Foi hoje publicado o meu novo artigo " O último suspiro do Euro": http://www.jornaldenegocios.pt/home.php ... &id=520741

Um abraço,
Ulisses

"It's the (European) Central Bank, stupid!..."
21 Novembro2011 | 23:30
Miguel Frasquilho


A crise da dívida soberana da Zona Euro não pára de crescer. Hoje, apenas um país do euro não é tratado como periférico: a Alemanha, como seria de esperar.
Mesmo países considerados financeiramente estáveis, como Holanda, Áustria, Finlândia (indefectíveis apoiantes da ortodoxia germânica), ou a gigante França, têm visto os "spreads" das respectivas taxas de juro alargar-se face às taxas alemãs. No caso francês - a 2ª maior economia do euro e a 5ª mundial (!), com uma dívida pública a aproximar-se de EUR 2 biliões (pouco menos do que a dívida italiana em valores absolutos) -, os "spreads" a 10 anos chegaram já a ultrapassar 200 pontos base, o que compara com uma média de 30-40 na primeira metade de 2011. A questão é: chegados a este ponto, existirá uma solução rápida e convincente que permita reverter a situação?...

Já não é uma novidade que os líderes políticos europeus e, sobretudo, os alemães (quem verdadeiramente exerce o poder na União Europeia, goste-se ou não) não actuaram, nunca, como deviam, a tempo e horas perante a crise. Pelo contrário, têm estado sempre "behind the curve". Inspirando cada vez menos confiança aos mercados financeiros. Uma solução que podia ter sido vista como a "grande bazuca", hoje, deixou de o ser. Refiro-me ao Fundo Europeu de Estabilização Financeira (FEEF), que não foi dotado a tempo e horas da dimensão necessária para lidar com a propagação da crise a grandes países. Poucos dias depois da Cimeira Europeia de 21 de Julho último escrevi, nesta coluna1, que as "soluções" então acordadas de pouco ou nada iriam servir (meu dito, meu feito, infelizmente). E apontei o reforço do FEEF para um valor em redor de EUR 1.5 biliões como sendo, na altura, uma solução robusta. Porquê?... Essencialmente porque seria suficiente para acudir a países "grandes", já na altura no "olho do furacão", como a Espanha e a Itália, em caso de necessidade2.

Infelizmente, tal não foi feito nessa altura - nem até agora. Pior: a "solução" saída da recente Cimeira de 26 de Outubro, de aumentar a capacidade do FEEF para cerca de EUR 1 bilião, além de insuficiente, assenta em "engenharia financeira" (alavancagem, endividamento) e não, como devia, acontecer, na injecção de dinheiro por parte dos países europeus. Ora, resolver um problema de endividamento com… mais endividamento parece-me, no mínimo, bizarro. Além de que a Europa parecia estar a contar com a disponibilização (leia-se, empréstimo) de verbas de instituições como o FMI e de países como os EUA ou os BRIC (Brasil, Rússia, Índia e China), o que fracassou. Porquê? Como referiu a Presidente brasileira, Dilma Rousseff, na Cimeira do G20 em Cannes, "não tenho a menor intenção de fazer nenhuma contribuição directa para o FEEF. Nem eles [europeus] têm, porque teria eu?" E está tudo dito…

Hoje, quando se permitiu que Espanha, Itália e França ficassem na mira dos mercados e dos investidores, só uma "grande bazuca" resta à Zona Euro: permitir que o Banco Central Europeu (BCE) compre ilimitadamente dívida soberana dos Estados-membros. Ou seja, que se torne o seu "lender of last resort", ou credor de último recurso.

Está instalada a ideia que tal não é permitido pelos Tratados Europeus e também pelos Estatutos da autoridade monetária europeia - o que não é verdade. O BCE está impedido, sim, de comprar dívida pública "nova" (art.º 21º dos Estatutos), isto é, o BCE não pode marcar presença na emissão de dívida pública, em leilões. Mas nada - repito - nada o impede de transaccionar (comprar) ilimitadamente dívida pública já existente no chamado mercado secundário. Basta-lhe, para tanto, emitir o dinheiro que para tal seja necessário. É isso que outros bancos centrais, como a Reserva Federal dos EUA, o Banco de Inglaterra ou o Banco do Japão, por exemplo, têm feito. E é isso que tem feito com que esses países, com fundamentais económicos piores do que a Zona Euro (incluindo défice público e dívida pública), consigam financiar-se a juros substancialmente mais baixos do que (agora) todos os países do euro com excepção da Alemanha. Nos respectivos leilões de dívida pública, os investidores estão, diga-mos, tranquilos e exigem juros menores porque têm a garantir que os bancos centrais dos EUA, Inglaterra e Japão - dados como exemplo - estão disponíveis para comprar toda e qualquer dívida pública destes países, tornando impossível um incumprimento. Ora, o que tem feito o BCE? É verdade que desde 2010 tem vindo a comprar dívida pública - mas de forma intermitente, e sempre com uma postura reticente e contrariada, o que tem alimentado a desconfiança dos investidores, levando os juros a subir e… paradoxalmente, forçando o BCE a compras adicionais (o que provavelmente não sucederia se o papel de "lender of last resort" fosse assumido).

A esta altura, interrogar-se-á o leitor: bom, se nada impede o BCE de comprar ilimitadamente no mercado de dívida pública dos países do euro, por que razão não o tem feito? Pois: é que o impedimento que existe não é legal nem formal - é político, e reside no dogmatismo da Alemanha.

Por razões históricas, existe na Alemanha um verdadeiro pavor de uma inflação exagerada: muitos acreditam que a hiper-inflação dos anos 20 do século passado contribuiu em grande escala para que Adolf Hitler tivesse ascendido ao poder (o resto da história é, infelizmente, conhecido). Porém, a hiper-inflação atrás mencionada situou-se na casa dos 12 (!) dígitos (isto é, mil milhões por cento)… Já hoje, mesmo que o BCE tivesse que emitir moeda em grandes quantidades para financiar a compra de dívida soberana, com uma economia deprimida como a europeia (com baixa procura e elevado desemprego), parece-me altamente improvável qualquer aceleração dos preços.

Claro que, avançando-se nesta direcção, teriam forçosamente que existir contrapartidas. Porque - e aí os receios da Alemanha podem ser entendidos -, se o BCE passasse a intervir como qualquer outro banco central, resgatando incondicionalmente os Estados-membros, estariam a ser eliminados os incentivos a prosseguir a austeridade e a realização das necessárias reformas estruturais. Que contrapartidas?... Uma muito maior integração económica - nomeadamente, ao nível orçamental (por exemplo, acções preventivas acrescidas e vigilância mais apertada; sanções efectivas e pesadas, políticas e financeiras, para os países transgressores; emissão de euro-obrigações). A caminho do federalismo. Com regras ditadas por… claro, adivinhou, caro leitor: a Alemanha. Quem paga, dita as regras e manda. Não se trataria, pois, de uma boleia aos países prevaricadores (entre os quais Portugal se encontra), que não teriam que se preocupar em pôr as contas em ordem nem pagar as suas dívidas; ao contrário: a contrapartida seria a continuação da austeridade que, queiramos ou não, precisa de continuar e não nos vai deixar durante alguns (largos…) anos, até as contas estarem em ordem. Claro que existiria uma perda adicional de soberania dos Estados-membros - mas não é já isso que hoje acontece com Portugal, por exemplo (bem como com a Grécia, a Irlanda e mesmo a Itália)?...

A verdade é que, ao ponto a que chegámos, a Europa, como a conhecemos, deixará de existir. Mas, sendo prático e realista, não existe alternativa - se não queremos assistir à desintegração da Zona Euro, sabe-se lá com que consequências económicas, sociais e geopolíticas para a Europa, que voltaria pelo menos 50 anos para trás.

Creio firmemente que com esta solução - que deve ser levada à prática sem demora -, a crise da dívida soberana da Zona Euro seria revertida e resolvida. Tal como Bill Clinton celebrizou a expressão "it's the economy, stupid!" durante a campanha presidencial contra George Bush (pai) em 1992, bem que agora apetece dizer "it's the (European) Central Bank, stupid!".

Nota Final: E Portugal, que papel pode desempenhar neste contexto para ajudar a resolver a crise? Com a dimensão que o nosso país possui e o ajustamento que tem que efectuar, a melhor contribuição é, realisticamente, cumprir o acordado e colocar a casa em ordem. Tudo o mais que se possa dizer sobre o assunto não passa, em minha opinião, de folclore e fogo-de-vista.



1 Artigo "Zona Euro: Ainda à Beira do Precipício", publicado no Jornal de Negócios em Agosto 02, 2011.

2 As necessidades conjuntas de financiamento de Espanha e Itália até 2014 ascendem a cerca de EUR 1.4 biliões (Espanha: EUR 530 mil milhões; Itália: EUR 860 mil milhões).

Economista
Ex-Secretário de Estado do Tesouro e das Finanças
miguelfrasquilho@yahoo.com