If you’ll pardon the color, we at Mercenary Trader can’t help but fully agree with this assessment from Helmut Weymar, a founder of the legendary Commodities Corp:
I thought random walk was bullshit… The whole idea that an individual can’t make serious money with a competitive edge over the rest of the market is wacko.
Amen to that. (Paul Samuelson, a godfather of EMH and the dean of neoclassical economics, apparently didn’t buy the bullshit either, as fully clarified here.)
As Market Wizard Larry Hite once observed, everyone he ever met who believed in efficient markets was poor. The poor eggheads argue, miraculously, that markets have some mysterious source of efficiency, unknown in source or sustenance, that prevents outperformance from being possible, even for the alpha dogs supposedly dominating markets in the first place!
This line of thought deserves outright scorn and ridicule, and perhaps a sense of wonder at the sheer pigheadedness of the assertion. (Man as consistently rational utility maximizer? No. Talent equally distributed? No. Information objectively interpreted? No. As Yale professor Robert J. Shiller has observed, the efficient market hypothesis is “one of the most remarkable errors in the history of economic thought.”)
When defending EMH in public, academic true believers resort to the “Trained Orangutan” argument, which basically asserts that money managers are little more than lucky coin flippers — and that with enough flippers on hand, one is bound to see the emergence of a few excellent track records solely on the basis of luck.
Warren Buffett, aka the greatest value investor of the age, took on this argument and demolished it in a tour de force titled “The Superinvestors of Graham and Doddsville.” You can read the whole piece here, or otherwise find it on the web.
Buffett’s essential rebuttal was that, if the trained orangutan / lucky coinflip charge held true, then the winners with long-term track records should have randomly distributed styles of varying logic and rationality.
One lucky flipper might believe in reading astrological signs, for example. Yet another might pray to Vishnu, or buy stocks that begin with the letter “R.” Those might be slight exaggerations… point being, though, that if the market winners win based on luck, as the random walkers assert, then the strategies of the “winners” should be sufficiently varied to suggest random intellectual distribution as a group.
This is not what happens.
As Buffett pointed out, in his circle — the value investing circle of the Graham and Dodd school — a class of investors did things the same way, focused on the same things, and applied the same philosophies and methodological principles to consistently outperforming the market. As Buffett put it,
If you were trying to analyze possible causes of a rare type of cancer — with, say, 1,500 cases a year in the United States — and you found that 400 of them occurred in some little mining town in Montana, you would get very interested in the water there, or the occupation of those afflicted, or other variables. You know it’s not random chance that 400 come from a small area. You would not necessarily know the causal factors, but you would know where to search.
I submit to you that there are ways of defining an origin other than geography. In addition to geographical origins, there can be what I call an intellectual origin. I think you will find that a disproportionate number of successful coin-flippers in the investment world came from a very small intellectual village that could be called Graham-and-Doddsville. A concentration of winners that simply cannot be explained by chance can be traced to this particular intellectual village.
Now, getting back to Druckenmiller — 30% returns compounded over 30 years. Was that a fluke, a quirk of genius, or an otherwise unapproachable result? No.
Besides the huge improbability of such a lengthy run via random chance, there is the fact that Druckenmiller and colleagues come from an “intellectual village” similar in spirit to Buffett’s — one that I call “The Supertraders of Global Macroville.”
In other words: Just as a class of value investors has managed to thrive and outperform over decades using the tenets of Graham and Dodd, a class of traders — the Supertraders of Global Macroville — has done the same thing using the essential principles as laid down by top practitioners over the years. Consider the following:
* Druckenmiller, a global macro specialist (and the architect of Soros’ career-defining British Pound trade in 1992), earned 30% returns over 30 years with no losing years.
* Paul Tudor Jones — the “Michael Jordan” of trading — has compounded at 27.4% annually in his Tudor Futures Fund since 1984 — more than a quarter century — and, like Druckenmiller, with no losing years.
* PTJ and Druckenmiller were known to talk virtually every day when Druckenmiller was active. (Perhaps they still do…?)
* Druckenmiller was a protege of George Soros, whose legendary Quantum Fund compounded at 32%+ between 1969 and 2000 (30+ years).
* When Soros published the Alchemy of Finance, Paul Tudor Jones was so enthused by its insights he demanded that all his people read it.
* The habits and philosophies of Druckenmiller, Jones, Bacon, Kovner, Marcus, and other macro trading legends all have traceable links to Commodities Corp, arguably making “Global Macroville” a physical place.
* The essentials of the macro trading style can be traced even further back, to the timeless tenets first expressed via Reminiscences of a Stock Operator in 1923.
That sounds very much like an intellectual community founded on replicable strategies and principles, does it not? (Which, of course, is exactly what it is.)
And of course, opportunities in the global macro or “top down” investing space remain as lucrative today as ever (if not more so), the basic elements of which are laid out in our Integrated Macro Analysis series. (More episodes are coming by the way — stay tuned!)
What’s more, one of the most attractive aspects of global macro — that space in which one treats the integrated combination of “top down,” “bottom up” and “price action” as Father, Son and Holy Ghost — is its relative imperviousness to supercomputers, High Freqency Trading programs, and other forms of short-term automated churn.
No computer program yet devised can match wits with a skilled and nuanced trader when it comes to isolating, targeting and exploiting the key thematic drivers of the day. In pulling all the threads together, and applying the accumulated lessons of market history and economic knowledge as one does so, there is simply too much embedded complexity for any silicon-based algorithm to handle.
As Reminiscences quite correctly observed so long ago,
There are men whose gait is far quicker than the mob’s. They are bound to lead—no matter how much the mob changes.