Greve alargada a mais três setores e contratos a prazo a três anos

[Açor3]

Ligeira retoma no segundo semestre de 2010
Juncker diz que a crise económica é "absolutamente catastrófica"
O ministro luxemburguês das Finanças, Jean-Claude Juncker, declarou que a crise financeira global é "absolutamente catastrófica" para as economias da Europa e do resto do mundo.

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Jornal de Negócios Online
negocios@negocios.pt


O ministro luxemburguês das Finanças, Jean-Claude Juncker, declarou que a crise financeira global é "absolutamente catastrófica" para as economias da Europa e do resto do mundo.

“A crise financeira, que prossegue e está longe do fim, mergulhou a economia europeia e do resto do mundo numa situação de crise com consequências absolutamente catastróficas”, afirmou hoje aquele responsável numa conferência de imprensa. “Praticamente não há sinais de que possamos estar a caminho de uma melhoria”, acrescentou, citado pela Bloomberg.

O Banco Central Europeu (BCE) reduziu ontem a sua taxa directora em meio ponto percentual, para 1,5%, e indicou que pode proceder a mais cortes para combater o deteriorar da recessão. A economia da Zona Euro está a contrair-se mais rapidamente do que aquilo que o BCE previa há três meses, numa altura em que o abrandamento económico global diminui a procura para exportação e as empresas despedem trabalhadores.

“Há riscos de que a situação se torne claramente pior na segunda metade deste ano”, advertiu Juncker, que é também primeiro-ministro do Luxemburgo e presidente do Eurogrupo. “Na Zona Euro, vai registar-se uma ligeira retoma da economia no segundo semestre de 2010, mas será mais tímida do que actualmente se prevê”, acrescentou.

O economista Nouriel Roubini, que previu a actual crise financeira, disse hoje que a recessão global poderá manter-se até ao final de 2010.


JN

[salvadorveiga]

Discordo do texto e deixo aqui um artigo elucidante relativamente ao credito

Jaguar Inflation
I am tired of hearing people insist that the Fed can expand credit all it wants. Sometimes an analogy clarifies a subject, so let’s try one.
It may sound crazy, but suppose the government were to decide that the health of the nation depends upon producing Jaguar automobiles and providing them to as many people as possible. To facilitate that goal, it begins operating Jaguar plants all over the country, subsidizing production with tax money. To everyone’s delight, it offers these luxury cars for sale at 50 percent off the old price. People flock to the showrooms and buy. Later, sales slow down, so the government cuts the price in half again. More people rush in and buy. Sales again slow, so it lowers the price to $900 each. People return to the stores to buy two or three, or half a dozen. Why not? Look how cheap they are! Buyers give Jaguars to their kids and park an extra one on the lawn. Finally, the country is awash in Jaguars. Alas, sales slow again, and the government panics. It must move more Jaguars, or, according to its theory — ironically now made fact — the economy will recede. People are working three days a week just to pay their taxes so the government can keep producing more Jaguars. If Jaguars stop moving, the economy will stop. So the government begins giving Jaguars away. A few more cars move out of the showrooms, but then it ends. Nobody wants any more Jaguars. They don’t care if they’re free. They can’t find a use for them. Production of Jaguars ceases. It takes years to work through the overhanging supply of Jaguars. Tax collections collapse, the factories close, and unemployment soars. The economy is wrecked. People can’t afford to buy gasoline, so many of the Jaguars rust away to worthlessness. The number of Jaguars — at best — returns to the level it was before the program began.
The same thing can happen with credit.
It may sound crazy, but suppose the government were to decide that the health of the nation depends upon producing credit and providing it to as many people as possible. To facilitate that goal, it begins operating credit-production plants all over the country, called Federal Reserve Banks. To everyone’s delight, these banks offer the credit for sale at below market rates. People flock to the banks and buy. Later, sales slow down, so the banks cut the price again. More people rush in and buy. Sales again slow, so they lower the price to one percent. People return to the banks to buy even more credit. Why not? Look how cheap it is! Borrowers use credit to buy houses, boats and an extra Jaguar to park out on the lawn. Finally, the country is awash in credit. Alas, sales slow again, and the banks panic. They must move more credit, or, according to its theory — ironically now made fact — the economy will recede. People are working three days a week just to pay the interest on their debt to the banks so the banks can keep offering more credit. If credit stops moving, the economy will stop. So the banks begin giving credit away, at zero percent interest. A few more loans move through the tellers’ windows, but then it ends. Nobody wants any more credit. They don’t care if it’s free. They can’t find a use for it. Production of credit ceases. It takes years to work through the overhanging supply of credit. Interest payments collapse, banks close, and unemployment soars. The economy is wrecked.

People can’t afford to pay interest on their debts, so many bonds deteriorate to worthlessness. The value of credit — at best — returns to the level it was before the program began.
See how it works?
Is the analogy perfect? No. The idea of pushing credit on people is far more dangerous than the idea of pushing Jaguars on them. In the credit scenario, debtors and even most creditors lose everything in the end. In the Jaguar scenario, at least everyone ends up with a garage full of cars. Of course, the Jaguar scenario is impossible, because the government can’t produce value. It can, however, reduce values. A government that imposes a central bank monopoly, for example, can reduce the incremental value of credit. A monopoly credit system also allows for fraud and theft on a far bigger scale. Instead of government appropriating citizens’ labor openly by having them produce cars, a monopoly banking system does so clandestinely by stealing stored labor from citizens’ bank accounts by inflating the supply of credit, thereby reducing the value of their savings.
I hate to challenge mainstream 20th century macroeconomic theory, but the idea that a growing economy needs easy credit is a false theory. Credit should be supplied by the free market, in which case it will almost always be offered intelligently, primarily to producers, not consumers. Would lower levels of credit availability mean that fewer people would own a house or a car? Quite the opposite. Only the timeline would be different. Initially it would take a few years longer for the same number of people to own houses and cars – actually own them, not rent them from banks. Because banks would not be appropriating so much of everyone’s labor and wealth, the economy would grow much faster. Eventually, the extent of home and car ownership – actual ownership – would eclipse that in an easy-credit society. Moreover, people would keep their homes and cars because banks would not be foreclosing on them. As a bonus, there would be no devastating across-the-board collapse of the banking system, which, as history has repeatedly demonstrated, is inevitable under a central bank’s fiat-credit monopoly.
Jaguars, anyone?

[Açor3]

Camilo Lourenço
Recessão longa e profunda
camilolourenco@gmail.com

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Aos poucos começam a ser conhecidos os estragos da crise financeira na economia real. Primeiro foi a Inglaterra a rever a queda do PIB; depois a Alemanha; e agora a Espanha. Sempre para pior... Ontem o BCE avançou que a crise se vai prolongar por 2010


Aos poucos começam a ser conhecidos os estragos da crise financeira na economia real. Primeiro foi a Inglaterra a rever a queda do PIB; depois a Alemanha; e agora a Espanha. Sempre para pior... Ontem o BCE avançou que a crise se vai prolongar por 2010, prevendo que o PIB caia entre entre 2,2% e 3,2% este ano. Não espanta por isso que tenha baixado as taxas de juro para valores recorde: 1,5% (deve cair para 1% até Junho).

Qual o efeito destas baixas no PIB? À partida será pequeno, o que parece um paradoxo: juros de 1,5%, em situação normal, são suficientes para garantir crescimento económico. O problema é que há outro factor a emperrar a recuperação: a desconfiança gerada pela (in)sanidade do sistema financeiro, que paralisou o comércio mundial, o investimento das empresas e a despesa das famílias. O mesmo é dizer que, enquanto não acabar a sangria de prejuízos monumentais dos bancos e enquanto não desaparecer o "ninguém-sabe-bem-quais-os-bancos-saudáveis", as coisas dificilmente melhoram. É por isso que corremos o risco de passar 2010 também em recessão. O que, bem vistas as coisas, nem é mau de todo. As crises financeiras têm um impacte violento no PIB. Em 1929 foi o que se viu: desemprego galopante, falências em massa e pobreza. O PIB só recuperou quatro anos depois. Desta vez não há desemprego galopante, há "safety net" (que minimiza a pobreza) e a recessão promete demorar dois anos. Se assim for...

JN