Tenho lido muitos comentários aqui no Caldeirão, (quase todos!) contra a nacionalização do BPN, ainda não percebi se tem essa opinião por ter sido tomada por este governo ou por critérios técnicos devidamente fundamentados.
Relembro que existiu um conselho europeu de ministros das finanças onde foi assumido que não iriam deixar falir nenhum banco europeu
Publicado no DN em 10-10-2008:
“Não haverá um Lehman na UE
Na Europa, a principal preocupação é evitar a falência de um banco. "Não toleraremos um Lehman Brothers europeu", disse a ministra francesa da Economia, citada pela agência AFP. "Quando cai uma peça de dominó, as outras caem de seguida", acrescentou. Para muitos especialistas, a verdadeira origem da presente crise de confiança no sistema bancário não está no subprime mas sim na falência do Lehman Brothers, em meados de Setembro - o único banco que Administração Bush deixou cair.”
"Estamos todos de acordo que nenhuma instituição com carácter sistémico possa falir", disse Jean-Claude Juncker, em nome do conjunto dos ministros das Finanças da Zona Euro. A chanceler alemã, Angela Merkel, também veio ontem frisar que "não podemos excluir nenhuma possibilidade".
“Em Portugal não será diferente. O ministro das Finanças, Teixeira dos Santos, garantiu que todos os depósitos estão a salvo. Sabendo que o fundo de garantia tem um limite (revisto em alta para 50 mil euros), o Governo está simplesmente a assumir que não deixará nenhum banco falir, nem que isso implique nacionalizá-lo.”
Relembro para quem não sabe que a grande depressão da década de 30 não foi só provocada pela queda da bolsa americana em 1929 mas também por o governo americano ter deixado falir um dos maiores bancos da época, o New York Bank of United States.
Fonte. Wikipedia (não gosto muio de usar a Wiki, mas para já serve…)
On 10 December 1930, a large crowd gathered at the Southern Boulevard branch in The Bronx seeking to withdraw their money and started the first bank run of the Great Depression. The New York Times reported that the run was based on a false rumor spread by a small merchant, a holder of stock in the bank, who claimed that the bank had refused to sell his stock. By the midday, a crowd of 20,000 to 25,000 people had gathered and had to be controlled by the police and by the end of the day, 2500 to 3000 depositors had withdrawn $2,000,000 from the branch. However, most of the 7000 depositors who came to withdraw their money, left their assets in the bank. One person stood in line for two hours to claim his $2 account balance. As the news spread, there were smaller runs at several other branches in the Bronx as well as in the East New York section of Brooklyn.[14]
The next day, fearing a run on the bank, the directors decided to close the bank and asked the Superintendent of Banks to take over the banks assets.[13]. The stock market reacted negatively with the stock price of the bank, which had traded as high as $91.50 during the year (and a lifetime high of $231.25 in 1928) dropping from $11.50 to $3.00 (with a low of $2.00). Most other bank stocks also sold off.[15] The directors of the bank as well as of other New York banks were optimistic that the bank would reopen in a few weeks and members of the New York Clearing House Association offered to lend Bank of United States depositors 50% of their deposits. At the same time, the office of the New York State Bureau of Securities announced that they had been investigating charges that the Bank of United States had sold stock to depositors under a one year guarantee against loss that they had not been honoring. The District Attorney's office undertook to examine the bank for possible crimes. Depositors thronged the bank branches but were turned away by mounted police and the Mayor of New York, Jimmy Walker began legal action to recover $1.5 million which the city had in the bank. The New York Times reported that gross deposits in the bank had dropped from $212 million to $160 million between 17 October 1930 and 11 December 1930.[13]
The closing of Bank of United States came as a shock to the banking industry which had not seen a failure of a large New York bank since the stock market crash of 1929 and the first failure of this magnitude since the failure of the Knickerbocker Trust Company in 1907.[16] Worried city and state officials tried to reassure the public by rushing through the program by which Bank of United States depositors could borrow money against their deposits.[17] Some depositors started to receive their loans on 23 December 1930 and The New York Times reported that throngs of depositors lined up to receive their loans, many arriving hours before the branches opened and many were turned away because they could not be served by the end of the day.[18]
Soon after the closing of the Bank of United States, another bank, the Chelsea Bank was taken over by the state banking superintendent, Joseph A. Broderick, amongst allegations attributed to 'reliable sources' that the Communist Party of America was actively trying to create a run on the bank (the Soviet Union was also accused of financing short seller's).[19] Meanwhile, a $50 million stockholder suit was launched against the directors of the bank on the grounds of negligence and incompetence,[20], a woman depositor with $20,000 in the bank hung herself,[21], and the Equity Casualty and Surety Company, which had invested more than $1 million in Bank of United States stock, declared bankruptcy.[22]
In 1930, Wall Street refused to help a bank it could have saved. That touched off a wildfire of failure throughout the American banking system. Some of its managers later went to jail. But it was a very large bank, the fourth-largest depository bank in New York, with 450,000 depositors, most of them middle- and working-class Jews from the Garment District. That's why it was known, sneeringly, as the "pants pressers' bank."
When the Bank of United States failed, on December 11th, 1930, the public panicked and the American banking system shuddered. People flocked to withdraw their money from other banks. In turn, the banks called in loans and sold assets in order to stay liquid. In that month alone, over 300 banks around the country failed.[2]
Infelizmente parece que os americanos não aprenderam nada com a história...
Continuando, tendo em conta os factos passados, a realidade actual, os compromissos assumidos pelo governo português em conjunto com os outros governos, parece-me que estes preferiram não pagar para ver, ou seja, entre deixar o mercado funcionar, com todas as consequências e supostamente poupar dinheiro aos contribuintes mas com a forte probabilidade de provocar uma corrida aos bancos semelhante à de 1930 que mergulhou o mundo na Grande Depressão ou nacionalizar os bancos em dificuldades, com maiores ou menores custos para os contribuintes (o governo Irlandês teve que ir ao Fundo de pensões publico, imaginem o que estariam a escrever aqui se o nosso governo fosse aos fundos da SS buscar dinheiro para salvar bancos...) mas mantendo as pessoas tranquilas e evitando o efeito dominó de 1930, preferiram o mal menor, na minha opinião bem.
Gostava de ler os motivos (devidamente fundamentados) dos críticos que defendem que os governos deviam deixar cair os bancos, sim, porque se criticam a nacionalização do BPN, estão a criticar todas as nacionalizações que tem acontecido um pouco por toda a Europa.
Um detalhe, tenham presente o seguinte, tomar decisões não é fácil quando está tanta coisa em jogo, digo isto porque parece-me que as decisões mais difíceis que a maior parte das pessoas que andam por aqui tem que fazer na vida, será definir valores de stops, de compra e venda. e pouco mais (para quem não percebeu, estou só a ser irónico..)
Um abraço
Alexandre Santos
Enviado: 16/2/2009 16:41