Apoios do E-Lar vão dos 146 euros para placas até aos 615 para termoacumuladores

[nunofaustino]

Porque ainda não são conhecidas todas as más notícias nem os cenários mais pessimistas (com algum realismo) ainda estão a ser equacionados...

Um abr
Nuno

[Ulisses Pereira]

"Why We Can't Get Any Capitulation"

By Jim Cramer
RealMoney.com Columnist
9/10/2008 9:50 AM EDT

"Capitulation is a strange animal. By any stretch of the imagination, we saw massive capitulation yesterday. You saw huge companies lose gigantic chunks of their capitalization. You saw sellers after sellers after sellers.




But what you NEVER saw was a stoppage in trading. It was all continuous.

And in many ways, that's why it is so bad.

Let me explain. In the old days, when there were the kinds of sellers that could take a Conoco (COP - commentary - Cramer's Take) down 3 or a Schlumberger (SLB - commentary - Cramer's Take) down 6, we might have an order imbalance where a big seller comes out, or several big sellers, and the market makers stop trading because the sellers can't find enough buyers to make the trade happen.

Now we don't stop trading.

We just let things get pummeled, and the shorts pile on at the same time.

It used to be highly unusual for so many sellers of one security to surface at the same time. When it is one seller, then that seller can work with a brokerage house to dispose of the block. We still have block trades; there was a 7.3-million-share block of Goodyear Tire (GT - commentary - Cramer's Take) that traded yesterday and an 11-million-share block of Cardinal Health (CAH - commentary - Cramer's Take) that got "put up."

But the sellers yesterday were a disorganized lot coming from all over the place. Many of the funds have the exact same playbook: Commodities going down? Sell the commodities stocks.

Meanwhile, given the plethora of sellers, no brokerage house can be fast enough to find buyers that can stabilize things or have an appetite for so much stock at one level.

Nor is it worth it, because there is no order to the madness out there. A broker might be working with a seller of 2 million shares of Potash (POT - commentary - Cramer's Take), when another 2-million-shares seller shows up, and then another guy with another 2 million. The owners of these stocks are so big that when they want to get out, they can't get out anywhere near the posted price.

So, no broker "positions" the stock, meaning buys it and then distributes it to customers -- the old way of doing things -- because no broker can take that risk.


Now the picture becomes several seven-figure sellers of stocks that can't handle anywhere near that volume. Meanwhile, other opportunistic hedge funds use the ETFs that are mimicking many of these stocks to force them down even faster.

So, if you are trying to sell 3 million shares of Halliburton (HAL - commentary - Cramer's Take) and 3 million shares of National Oil Varco (NOV - commentary - Cramer's Take), there will most likely be two or three other hedge funds doing the same thing, and the pattern becomes so clear to other accounts who hear from salespeople that they have a large seller of 3 million HAL, that it is worth it go in and short the Oil Services HOLDRs (OIH - commentary - Cramer's Take) and not cover until all of that HAL trades.

Of course, we know that all of it can't trade, because there are other hedge funds with the same positions behind it.

The effect? Unlike the old days, we can't get capitulation. There is too much stock from too many sellers all at once.

Why don't the sellers walk away, like the old days? Why don't they just say, "Look, I was a seller of Conoco at $75 but not $68?"

That's a different story. Some of the sellers might not be in control of the money; they are meeting redemptions. Others think now that oil will go down substantially from here; the last time the OIH was at these prices -- a good proxy for the future -- oil was at $66. If oil goes to $66, there's no way Conoco can stay up here. It is more likely to trade down to $50 or $55.

So why not, even if you like it, sell a lot and buy it back at that price?

Meanwhile, because these stocks are based on commodities, not steady-eddie EPS machines like Procter (PG - commentary - Cramer's Take), there really isn't any way to figure out when they will stop going down. We know from Terex (TEX - commentary - Cramer's Take), which looked cheap, that when the earnings got hit, it got really expensive. Who is to say that COP isn't expensive if oil goes to $60?


So you can't get capitulation, because you aren't at absurd levels and you don't have dividend support.

Now layer in the FedEx (FDX - commentary - Cramer's Take) equation. As oil goes down, there are winners, too. But they ain't the oils, they are the companies that have been killed by higher oil prices.

So, to add insult to injury, the stuff being sold is wrong! Much better to buy a UPS (UPS - commentary - Cramer's Take) or a Disney (DIS - commentary - Cramer's Take) -- big beneficiaries -- than a Chevron (CVX - commentary - Cramer's Take) or a Baker Hughes (BHI - commentary - Cramer's Take). How can you not buy Kimberly Clark (KMB - commentary - Cramer's Take) with this decline in raw costs? It's really compelling, more compelling than Exxon (XOM - commentary - Cramer's Take) here.

So it goes on and on. If the oil futures go up, you get a small rally, but not large enough to allow a slower raising of capital, because the investors who want out aren't going away.

Bottom line: We can bounce. But the ineluctable nature of the commodity stocks, overowned by hedge funds that must liquidate, can't end until either we get sharply lower prices or they finish their selling, and neither is a recipe for the fabled capitulation that marks a bottom ... unless they stocks get so cheap on an earnings basis and their cash, or their dividends approach 4% and a cushion might be established.

Oh, and one more thought, in these environments, the buyback means ABSOUTELY NOTHING because it can't sop up even one hedge fund's worth of volume.

The volumes of the buybacks are minuscule as opposed to the amount that hedge funds must sell every day to meet redemptions or get the stocks to a level where they reflect a worst-case commodity scenario.

Random musings: When the biggest factor in a stock is the man behind the stock -- Steve Jobs at Apple (AAPL - commentary - Cramer's Take) -- you cannot blame people for blowing out the stock or shorting it given his history of cancer and his emaciated looks. This is a hard game. It's like the NFL: If you are betting on the Pats and you think that Brady's knee is hurt, you are going to lose. ... I will have a lot on Lehman (LEH - commentary - Cramer's Take) later, but Fuld could have done this deal months ago, that's how stupid this move is. Then he would have had something.

At the time of publication, Cramer was long National Oilwell Varco and Procter & Gamble. "

(in www.realmoney.com)