Caldeirão da Bolsa

Todd H.: "Nick and Toni Revisit the Tape"

Espaço dedicado a todo o tipo de troca de impressões sobre os mercados financeiros e ao que possa condicionar o desempenho dos mesmos.

Boas Ffesteiro e MarcoAntonio

por Eagle Eye 2002 » 4/8/2008 23:20

Estou totalmente de acordo convosco.

No entanto ha um detalhe enorme que diferencia um bull market de um bear market: a frustaçao depressiva que faz com que a emoçao negativa prevaleça sobre a razao. Esta emoçao e fatal num bear market, ao contrario do que acontece num bull market que perdoa muitas mas decisoes.

Na minha opiniao isso e muito pior que, ou pelo menos amplifia brutalmente, o facto do equilibrio entre risco e recompensa de uma posiçao curta ser inferior ao de uma posiçao longa, ou ainda a necessidade de preservar a disciplina acima da convicçao.

Note-se, que as diferenças de risco/recompensa entre uma posiçao longa e uma curta so sao visiveis com performances ja elevadas.

Por outro lado, a disciplina num bear market equivale a preservar o capital. Isso nao implica nunca investir, mas sim investir de forma extremamente cirurgica, com muita paciencia.

Um abraço,
Eagle Eye
 
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por MarcoAntonio » 4/8/2008 18:42

Eagle Eye 2002 Escreveu:Este texto e muito interessante, cheio de pequenas liçoes sabias.

A frase "Remember, in a bear market, nobody makes money—not even the bears!" deixou-me a pensar.


Sim, essa questão tende a ser bastante menosprezada pelos investidores em geral, que julgam que posições curtas em bear market é "cada tiro, cada melro" e que os bears/curtos são uns tipos que fazem muito dinheiro à custa da desgraça dos outros.

Obviamente (e não tendo lido ainda o texto todo anterior) julgo que ele não quer dizer que ninguém faz dinheiro estando curto no bear market.

A questão será mais num conjunto alargado de investidores e trades short do que em investidores ou trades individuais.


A questão sobre porque é que isso acontece já se encontra abordada neste meu artigo:

http://caldeiraodebolsa.jornaldenegocio ... hp?t=59517



Em termos simples/sucintos eu defino as posições curtas como posições intrinsecamente arriscadas, de risco acrescido (muito embora pouco visível e que tende a passar despercebido aos mais leigos).

Quando as coisas correm mal numa posição curta, as perdas tendem a ser maiores e o controlo do investidor quando em comparação com a situação em posições longas (por exemplo, pode ser obrigado a vender contra a vontade, coisa que não acontece do lado longo a menos que alavanque).

Quando as coisas correm bem numa posição curta, os ganhos tendem a ser mais pequenos (e progressivamente mais pequenos) e sempre limitados abaixo dos 100%. Coisa que mais uma vez não acontece do lado longo.


Estou a insistir nisto porque nesta fase do mercado e numa altura em que tanto se fala de posições curtas, tantas questões se levantam sobre as mesmas e eventualmente tantos ponderam experimentar, parece-me oportuno repetir estes esclarecimentos uma e outra vez.
Imagem

FLOP - Fundamental Laws Of Profit

1. Mais vale perder um ganho que ganhar uma perda, a menos que se cumpra a Segunda Lei.
2. A expectativa de ganho deve superar a expectativa de perda, onde a expectativa mede a
__.amplitude média do ganho/perda contra a respectiva probabilidade.
3. A Primeira Lei não é mesmo necessária mas com Três Leis isto fica definitivamente mais giro.
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por Festeiro » 4/8/2008 18:28

Saudações,
Eagle Eye 2002,
se aceitas um comentário eu diria que a regra nº 1 talvez não seja preservar o capital.
Sei que é comum dizer-se isso. Preservar o capital será mais o resultado do que propriamente uma estratégia ou uma regra de “bom trading”.
Sei que esgotado o $$$ não há hipótese de especular/investir na bolsa. Sei também que não tenho quaquer formação académica que permita credibilizar as minhas afirmações mas, utilizando o chamado o senso comum, diria que a regra nº 1 talvez seja mesmo "disciplina acima da convicção". Porquê? porque quando "se vai para a bolsa" não é só para preservar o $$$, mas para aumentá-lo (embora a noção de preservar não exclua a de o aumentar).
O mais difícil é afastar os juízos preconcebidos que se vão fazendo e que viciam a estratégia. A versatilidade para, a cada momento, integrar e adaptar-se às novas situações é fundamental para qualquer investidor que queira ter sucesso.
Bem, perdoem-me esta filosofia barata…
:oops: Boa sorte.
As palavras levam à exaltação, os números à meditação.
 
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por Eagle Eye 2002 » 4/8/2008 17:17

Este texto e muito interessante, cheio de pequenas liçoes sabias.

A frase "Remember, in a bear market, nobody makes money—not even the bears!" deixou-me a pensar. E obvio que a extrema maioria dos investidores esquecem a regra #1: preservar o capital. E ja agora #2, ..., pelo menos ate ao #10. :twisted:
Saltando de excitaçao infantil em frustaçao depressiva, com um fundo comum de hiper-actividade bolsista, a maior parte dos investidores activos acabam um bear market como um dead man walking e sem condiçoes para aproveitar o bull que começa.

No entanto, eu teria tendencia a argumentar que num bear market ha 2 tipos de estrategias que permitem ganhar dinheiro:
- a de longo prazo, uma vez a tendencia identificada deixa-se "correr" o mercado entre vales e montanhas... mas e preciso ter a disciplina necessaria para fechar os olhos e limitar-se a seguir uma media movel de medio prazo em queda.
- a "cirurgica", que implica negociar os extremos de sentimento negativo, ie, os bear market rallys... que podem ser muito lucrativos.

Em ambos os casos, os investidores interveem muito, muito pouco no mercado. Uma compra ou uma venda e mais a excepçao do que a regra.

Uma combinaçao das duas pode ser muito poderosa, mas psicologicamente parece-me muito dificil um trader conseguir saltar de curto a longo e vice-versa sem perder o fio condutor e uma disciplina rigida.

Nao sei se alguem conhece day-traders que sobrevivam em mercados bear, eu nao.

Some random thoughts de alguem que espera pacientemente :) , as criticas sao bem vindas,

Eagle Eye
 
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Todd H.: "Nick and Toni Revisit the Tape"

por Ulisses Pereira » 4/8/2008 16:06

"Nick and Toni Revisit the Tape"
Todd Harrison
Aug 04, 2008 8:13 am


" How do real traders deal with this kind of market?





A few weeks ago, upon returning from a respite, I shared a conversation I had with a friend from the East end. The frisky fellow, “Toni” in those musings, is a world-renowned short seller. Our dialog occurred while dining at the delectable Nick and Toni’s eatery on a summer night.

This past weekend, as the storms unleashed fury and hell on the big city, we reconnected to continue our dialog. The markets, moods and mindsets were in a vastly different place than the last time we spoke and I wanted to share the fare for the benefit of ye faithful.

Nick:
When we last connected on July 14th, the market was slipping into an abyss as Hank and Ben furiously tried to stick their fingers in the financial dike.

I spoke at the time of scaling into the despair and buying stocks—in particular, the financials—for a trade. That risk was rewarded in kind.

Now, the “easy trade” is gone—if you can call historically significant socialization efforts in Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE) “easy”—what are your thoughts looking forward?

Toni: With the benefit of hindsight, July 15th looks like it marked a classic capitulation low in the BKX. And what a panic it was—on that date Bank of America (BAC) traded at $18 (it's now $33) and yielded over 11%. Wachovia (WB), for its part, doubled in price since we last spoke

Another Prince—from the Far East—was rumored to be necessary to save Citigroup (C) and Lehman Brothers (LEH) was pulling a Bear Stearns. And, the you know what was hitting the Fannie (one of the "government sponsored agencies" that you mentioned).

I generally agree with your characterization that the "easy trade" in the financials is over. I suspect, too, many have covered their shorts in the crowded arena of banks and brokers – in part due to the strange, convoluted and threatening naked shorting edict issued by the SEC.

But problems, as you well know, linger in spades in the financial complex – and the indigestion will not be cured by two tablets of Pepto Bismol. So, perhaps Bearus Interruptus short term–but not intermediate term!

Remember, just as with the dot.com implosion in early 2000, the subslime housing problem was judged by many in 2004 and 2005 as being unimportant to the macro picture.

Not!

Nick: As often noted in Minyanville, 25% of the financial universe disappeared during the 1989-1991 recession and only ten percent has thus far vanished during an entirely more daunting credit debacle. So yes, there are some dead men walking out there and the pain will be more pervasive before this period passes.

With that said, I scribed vibe on July 16th into the meat of the heat that offered “The Future is Now” with regard to the structural dilemma we collectively face. I further opined that the market, as a forward looking discounting mechanism, priced those fears into the near-term tape and the stage was set to burn the fur on late-to-the-party bears.

The fact that the trading low—not to be confused with a market bottom—was put in place at precisely the same time Ben Bernanke finally admitted to serious economic issues was serendipitous to say the least.

I look at the market through four primary lenses—nuances, trends, phases and cycles—and remain of the view that we’re in a multi-year deleveraging process (bear cycle). This has phased through the homebuilders, banks and financials in drag (such as General Electric (GE), General Motors (GM) and Ford (F)) and the baton has been passed to retail (consumer risk), technology (consumer and enterprise risk), credit card companies and will eventually infect the commodity complex.

Still, and some would say despite that, it is the second lens—the trend—that holds the near-term key to the vault. As I wrote in Frame of Reference, the higher lows (S&P 1235 and BKX 60) can be used as a bovine backstop until they’re violated. Technical analysis is a better context than catalyst, I know, but it’s a framework with which to define risk.

Toni: In other words, you are letting the market deliver you its message and presuming that the July lows will not be penetrated?

Nick: Not entirely—I’m of the school that there are two types of traders in today’s market: the proactive set, which is how I approached the July lows, and the dead set (and I’m not talking about the 1981 live album by Jerry and friends).

The key in understanding the subtle yet important difference lies in the stylistic approach. Into July 15th, due to the massively oversold conditions, I scaled into exposure as a function of price. There was plenty of risk—the wheels felt like they were gonna wobble right off the wagon and if they did, I would have taken quite a hit.

The last two weeks, while primarily trading from the long side, I had a “hit it to quit it” mentality. I set tight stops under my entry levels and kept a close hold of my risk leash. I was stopped out a few times but managed to catch the meat of a few moves as well.

One of the reasons I’m trading this way is that I want to keep overnight risk to a minimum and pound my glove like Graig Nettles each morning. If the tenor of the tape changes, I’m able to pounce accordingly without having an emotional attachment to my positions.

Gun to head, if you asked me for my gut feel, I would say that the upside has further room to run before reality sets in.

Toni: I love the voodoo that you do so well! Let me try to differentiate MY trading from MY investment view.

Quite honestly, this market has more moves than a shortstop batting .110. Last week the Dow Jones Industrial Average moved 200 points on three consecutive days (and missed the fourth by thismuch).

The random and trendless nature of these moves makes for difficult investing but presents unprecedented trading opportunities (particularly the one-day variety). So I think you throw technicals out the door, buy the dips and sell the rips as a short-term tactical strategy.

From an investing standpoint, the situation becomes murkier. As you said to start this session, the credit cycle and its ramifications dwarf everything else. It seems to me that when credit is dear and generally less plentiful, economic growth will diminish and price/earnings multiple expansion will be limited and, more likely, could very well contract.

No economy can live beyond its means in perpetuity. As we are painfully learning, the American consumers’ audacious asset-based consumption binge over the last decade is now coming to an end. And if you believe Nouriel Roubini in this week's Barron's, the leading financial institutions might have another $1 trillion+ of writedowns ahead of them.

Nick:
You don’t have to twist my arm to be bearish on the big picture, my friend. I’ve said—and I’ll continue to say—that we’ve got five lean years ahead of us as the socioeconomic malaise manifests and societal acrimony percolates.

Social mood and risk appetites shape markets, not the other way around.

It should be noted, however, that many people considered my view—and that of Minyanville in general—to be too bearish throughout 2005 and 2006 (with the exception of energy and metals, which we were steadfastly bullish on).

Just as the crowd was giddy into the Blackstone (BX) and Fortress (FIG) IPO’s—remember those?—they’re looking to lynch someone now. We’ll certainly see tree-swinging stocks by the time this period passes but the destination we arrive at pales in comparison with the path that we take to get there.

As a trader, the last thing you want to do is overstay your welcome on either side of the ride during this furious fray.

As an investor, you’ll want to proactively prepare for what’s to come by preserving capital, reducing debt and increasing financial intelligence.

Make it to take it, hit it to quit it and discipline over conviction as we find our way.

Toni: You are beginning to sound like The Bearded Prophet of the Apocalypse— a dear old friend of mine who was given HIS pseudonym by Barton Biggs while he was the head of investment strategy at Morgan Stanley "in the good old days."

I thought I, (a dedicated short seller) Toni, was supposed to be the Cassandra! Let me ask you something, Nicki—isn't an intermediate term period of substandard return expectations now very much the consensus?

Shouldn't we consider a variant view—either of an uber-Bear Market or by contrast, a surprisingly healthy Bull Market— as an alternative?

Nick: I’ll again point to the time horizon. The path of maximum frustration may very well include a rally much stronger than most expect into the election—shocker, eh?—followed by a period entirely more depressing than a recession.

Remember, in a bear market, nobody makes money—not even the bears!

Toni: Thanks Toddo, er, I mean Nick. Darn—hey, do you think people have figured out that you’re Todd Harrison from Minyanville yet?

Nick: Only if they’ve figured out that you’re Doug Kass from Seabreeze Partners!

Good luck my friend—hit ‘em where they ain’t!

R.P. "

(in www.minyanville.com)
"Acreditar é possuir antes de ter..."

Ulisses Pereira

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