CALDEIRÃO DE BOLSA

atenção ao pormenor de que o Buffet vai conseguir uma participação de $2.1b em acçoes a um preço inferior as que serão compradas a $80

resguarda-se, apesar de acreditar no investimento, porque não tem o controlo da empresa e esta não vai ser gerida exclusivamente segundo a sua filosofia

SexPistolsPT Escreveu:Para resumir ainda mais: Se pesquisarem um bocado vão chegar à conclusão que Warren Buffet pouco se importa com Análises Técnicas, e todas as empresas que lhe interessam têm lucros crescentes, isto é, o lucro do actual ano é superior ao ano que passou, o ano que passou teve lucro superior ao de há dois anos e assim sucessivamente. Para ele pouco importa gráficos de comportamento de acções e historiais dos titulos. Ele compra conforme a consistência do negócio, chama-se a isso Compra na Prespectiva do Negócio.

Comprar na prespectiva de negócio, é algo díficil de fazer e eu ainda não sei bem definir. É ver o que os outros todos não veêm!!!
Penso que ele não se guia apenas pelos lucros crescentes e consistentes. Para além disso, e a primeira coisa que um Buffettologista tem que ter em mente, é que, os lucros não são gerados todos da mesma maneira.
O investimento, os cash flows, e a consistência do Capital Próprio são muito importantes.
Ver os sectores! Administração séria. Há mais que um factor a ter em conta.
Vejam o gráfico da CocaCola, quando ele comprou pela primeira vez em 1988, Não a comprou barata, pagou um preço superior por ela. A empresa já vinha em valente sentido ascendente, e depois após a correcção de 1987 (compra) vejam o que aconteceu...

Para resumir ainda mais: Se pesquisarem um bocado vão chegar à conclusão que Warren Buffet pouco se importa com Análises Técnicas, e todas as empresas que lhe interessam têm lucros crescentes, isto é, o lucro do actual ano é superior ao ano que passou, o ano que passou teve lucro superior ao de há dois anos e assim sucessivamente. Para ele pouco importa gráficos de comportamento de acções e historiais dos titulos. Ele compra conforme a consistência do negócio, chama-se a isso Compra na Prespectiva do Negócio.

É preciso não esquecer que a Wrigley é a 1 ou 2 maior empresa de chewing Gum que até o Buffet adora ou seja se compras a unica empresa que vende um produto ficas com o "monopoli" ou sejas dominas um mercado a possibilidade de ganhar lucro é inimaginável o homem viu essa oportunidade ai está a visão do homem.

BN

A ideia de que Buffet procura apenas empresas subavaliadas é errada. Ele procura empresas que lhe transmitam confiança no longo prazo, mesmo que para isso tenha de pagar um preço justo. Só para dar um exemplo, em 2000 a berkshire comprou a Shaw Industries por 19 dólares por acção, com um prémio de 56% em relação ao preço de transacção da altura (cerca de 12 dolares/acção). E claro, revela-se hoje em mais uma compra de grande sucesso, à medida do que Buffet nos tem acostumado

já agora...

não consegues tirar o : "commentary - Cramer's Take" ?

cumprimentos

"Kass: Spitting Out the Wrigley News"

By Doug Kass
RealMoney Silver Contributor
4/28/2008 11:59 AM EDT


Grantham Digs Deeper
7:23 a.m EDT

There are a number of modern day investors that I truly admire (all for different reasons):


Berkshire Hathaway's (BRK.A - commentary - Cramer's Take) Warren Buffett for his patience, logic of argument and sense of a "margin of safety";

Soros Fund Management's George Soros for his ability to aggressively press an investment thesis;

Capital Growth Management's Ken Heebner for his capacity to isolate (and concentrate in) today's and tomorrow's market leaders;

Fidelity Magellan's Peter Lynch (retired) for his adaptive, bottom-up approach to investing;

Omega Advisors' Leon Cooperman for his work ethic and his thorough company knowledge (as he goes "belly to belly" with managements); and

SAC's Steve Cohen and Steinhardt Partners' Michael Steinhardt (retired) for their trading acumen and ability to adjust to different market cycles.
In terms of providing a (written) sense of historical perspective and in expressing and weighing the current risks/rewards in the equity and fixed income markets, however, GMO's Jeremy Grantham has no peers.

Here is Grantham's first-quarter 2008 letter to investors. It is a great read and outlines far better than I can the potential risks facing equity investors over the next few years.



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What Exactly Did Buffett Buy?
9:02 a.m. EDT

The acquisition of Wrigley (WWY - commentary - Cramer's Take) is being funded by $11 billion from Mars, a $5.7 billion senior debt facility from Goldman Sachs (GS - commentary - Cramer's Take) and from $4.4 billion of subordinated debt from Berkshire Hathaway.

Berkshire has not apparently received equity in the entire Wrigley entity but rather will be purchasing a minority equity interest (for $2.1 billion) in a Wrigley subsidiary at a discount to the share price being paid to the shareholders of Wrigley.

With all the questions being bombarded on Buffett on CNBC just now, I would have liked a commentator to ask which subsidiary and why he didn't take a position in the entire company.

I would also add that the Wrigley deal supports some of my bearish rationale for being short Berkshire Hathaway, in that Buffett's ability to buy the type of world-class consumer franchise that has been his trademark (and at a reasonable price) has diminished based on the size of the Wrigley premium.

Spoiling the Bullish Nondurables Thesis
9:24 a.m. EDT

Jim "El Capitan" Cramer concludes that, based on Buffett's Wrigley involvement and his comments on CNBC, consumer nondurables are cheap.

I couldn't disagree more.

I am short Colgate-Palmolive (CL - commentary - Cramer's Take), Kellogg (K - commentary - Cramer's Take), General Mills (GIS - commentary - Cramer's Take) and Kraft (KFT - commentary - Cramer's Take) -- stocks that are trading between 17 times and 24 times earnings, with between 7% and 10% secular growth rates.

PEG (price-to-earnings-growth) rates of 2 times have no interest for me, especially in the face of the commodity headwinds these companies now face and will likely face for years ahead.



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Buffett's Trick Gum Marketing Scheme
11:27 a.m. EDT

Buffett demonstrated his brilliance this morning in the Wrigley deal, not as an investor necessarily but as a marketer.

Why do I write this?

I believe his $4.4 billion of subordinated debt to Mars used to finance a portion of the Wrigley purchase was a sideshow.

The real brilliance is how Buffett has marketed himself and Berkshire Hathaway as the safe "go-to guys" without an agenda.

As a result, Buffett got a sweetheart deal and was able to invest an additional $2.1 billion at a discount to the share price paid to other Wrigley shareholders in the tender.

Here is the precise wording of the press release:


Funding for the transaction includes about $11 billion from Mars, a $5.7 billion committed senior debt facility from Goldman Sachs, and $4.4 billion of subordinated debt from Berkshire Hathaway Inc. At closing, Berkshire Hathaway has committed to purchase a minority equity interest for $2.1 billion in a Wrigley Co. subsidiary at a discount to the share price being paid to the stockholders of Wrigley."

(in www.realmoney.com)

A Wrigley não é uma empresa qualquer. É segura!
Esta tem um segredo que em tempos de inflacção protege o accionista. Nós em Portugal não temos nada com que se pareça (pelo menos na bolsa).
Não para agora, mas de uma prespectiva de longo prazo a 10 anos, certamente vale a pena pagar o preço que ele paga, em vez de ir procurar outra empresa nova que não lhe dá certezas. Basta o preço justo, não é necessária estar barata!
Buffett é assim!!!

Qual é o espanto?

Why Buffett wants Wrigley

Monday’s merger of closely-held chocolate giant Mars and gum seller Wrigley (WWY) will give Berkshire Hathaway (BRKA) a stake in a business CEO Warren Buffett knows well. The deal, valued at $23 billion, or $80 per Wrigley share, will be financed by Berkshire along with Goldman Sachs (GS) and JPMorgan (JPM). Berkshire will then take a minority stake in Wrigley once it becomes a Mars subsidiary and takes over Mars’ non-chocolate candy businesses, such as Skittles and Starburst.

A minority stake in Wrigley will be small change for Berkshire, which had $39 billion in cash at year-end. But in this year’s letter to shareholders, Buffett described a candy company he has owned since 1972 - See’s Candy of San Francisco - as “the prototype of a dream business,” because of its hefty cash flow.

Buffett conceded that the boxed-chocolates business is “unexciting” and noted that See’s has reported only 2% annual production growth in the 35 years since Berkshire took it over. Yet the business has posted pretax earnings of $1.35 billion, despite Berkshire’s having made a minuscule capital investment of $32 million. Buffett says he and Vice Chairman Charlie Munger have used See’s profits to buy other businesses. “Just as Adam and Eve kick-started an activity that led to 6 billion humans,” wrote Buffett, “See’s has given birth to multiple new streams of cash for us. (The biblical command to ‘be fruitful and multiply’ is one we take seriously at Berkshire.)”

isto ajuda a compreender

Tava agora mesmo a pensar sobre isto Ulisses.

O que é que leva o maior génio dos negócios (pelo menos o mais rico) a oferecer por uma empresa mais do que o seu máximo histórico?

Pelo seu historial aposta em empresas baratas e que tenham um negócio com o qual se sinta à vontade. Segundo os analistas, comparada com outras do mesmo ramo esta está cara, porém o Buffet pensa que não.

Será que esta jogada do Buffet pode indicar que de facto esta crise está a tornar as empresas subavaliadas ? Que todo o pânico gerado está a fazer ignorar a capacidade de gerar dinheiro da maior parte das empresas ? Se considerasse que a crise seria pior do que é, não avançaria para um negócio deste valor, sinceramente acho que pode ser um sinal de recuperação.

Os eua continuam no limite do verde mas isto poderá ser um indicador forte para ajudar os touros a quebrarem as resistências.

Só acho que há um problema nesta teoria, o Buffet pode achar que a exposição à crise é bastante baixa, porque sinceramente as pastilhas elasticas são baratissimas e mesmo em tempos de crise ninguem se preocupa muito com 5 cents... se uma empresa é o maior fabricante do mundo e se os hábitos estão instalados, os lucros não vão sofrer grandes alterações.

Já tou confuso..

"Buffett Move Suggests Financials Are No Value"

By Jim Cramer
RealMoney.com Columnist
4/28/2008 9:10 AM EDT



"Of all the packaged-goods companies I follow, the most expensive one by far is Wrigley (WWY - commentary - Cramer's Take). More expensive that Coke (KO - commentary - Cramer's Take), more expensive than Pepsi (PEP - commentary - Cramer's Take), more expensive than General Mills (GM - commentary - Cramer's Take) or Kellogg (K - commentary - Cramer's Take).

And Wrigley is the one that Buffett targets? First, I don't mess with Buffett. He is one of the few guys out there who is innocent until proven guilty. He likes brands and he likes easily figure-outable companies. Few are easier to figure out and more branded. (Not overlooking that the bid is a Mars bid, but $80!!! Holy cow!!! A huge multiple to earnings.)

But this one, a company selling at 27 times earnings until this morning, makes a telling case for questioning not Buffett's judgment -- that will NEVER be questioned as long as he lives -- but the so-called valuation case for the financials that I read about endlessly in the press.

Buffett likes solid normalized earnings of easily understood companies. The financials have taken their earnings away from normalized into uncharted waters in part because of the devastation of their traditional method of making money -- lending and then securitizing -- but also because of the massive increases in equity. The dilution is frightening, as is the denial of the ability to make lots of money when things get better.

I find this lack of Buffett buying to be eyebrow-raising, but this potential purchase of Wrigley to me says, "There is no value in a these regionals." Remember that the last banking recession, in 1991, saw a dramatic increase in the number of Wells Fargo (WFC - commentary - Cramer's Take) shares bought by Buffett. Surely there's a financial that has become as attractive as that one ... or at least I thought there was until this morning.

If anything, I have to ask: What does it say for the valuations of the Pepsis? Maybe they have gotten too cheap? That's a bold statement, but maybe a true one. "

(in www.realmoney.com)