Receitas turísticas da UE cresceram à boleia do turismo interno em 2023

[salvadorveiga]

Entretanto penso que nao tinha deixado o link para as inumeras cartas do Warren Buffett da primeira "companhia" dele...sao bem interessantes e deixo aqui o link sao cerca de 12 anos:

http://www.soundofgold.com/2007/11/29/l ... p-letters/

[salvadorveiga]

Haveria de haver um assim agora... tive a ler algumas letters e realmente são mesmo interessantes...nota-se a daada altura que a partnership era familiar em que 66% era capital dele da mulher, dos filhos, dos cunhados, dos primos, amigos, etc...

Saltou-me também a vista uma frase dele, quando diz aos investidores que oa investimentos dele estão todos na Partnership

"I can't promise you results, but I promise you a common destiny for you and I"

[Branc0]

Gente séria e honesta é outra coisa...

[JCS]

Excelente artigo.


JCS

[salvadorveiga]

Boas deixo aqui um texto elaborado por um user noutro forum em ingles sobre Buffett ainda antes da Berkshire quando ele liderava a Buffett Partnership Limited.

Em 10 anos teve rendimentos de 29% anuais, e NUNCA teve um ano negativo nem sequer abaixo dos 6%, ao inves que o DOW durante esses 10 anos, desceu por 4 vezes rondando os -10%.

Mais ainda é interessante o metodo de remuneração que ele se propunha a ganhar... ou seja, os ganhos principais ate 6% iam para os investidores sem ele receber qualquer tipo de comissao (isto porque era o que os investidores receberiam numa aplicação na altura sem RISCO) a partir dai ele cobrava 25% dos lucros acima dos 6%.

Realmente há mesmo que aplaudir o tipo de seriedade do homem...mas entretanto deixo o texto

I have owned shares of Berkshire for years and try to invest in a similar sytyle. Given the decline of the market, the MDP, and my own portfolio, I began wondering how young Warren trounced Mr. Market during all the years that he ran the Buffett Partnership (BP) and managed smaller sums? Managing Berkshire Hathaway, particularly in more recent years with many billions to invest and outright ownership of dozens of companies, is far different than managing lesser sums. To paraphrase him from the 2007 Berkshire Annual Shareholder’s meeting, “Back then I had more ideas than money. Now I have more money than ideas.” All kidding aside how did he not only beat the Market year after year, but not have a negative year when there were multiple years that the Dow declined?

With that in mind, I found and read many of the Buffett Partnership Letters written in the 1960’s to see what he said and what he did. Here is the link to the Letters (http://www.soundofgold.com/2007/11/29/learn-to-inv... which make for very Foolish reading.

I will provide some excerpts that I thought were particularly interesting. Keep in mind that he was around 30 years old when the first of these letters was written and already he had been buying and selling stocks for around two decades, had studied and worked under Ben Graham, had started his own partnership in 1957, and was not yet known as the Oracle of Omaha. To give some perspective of the market he was investing in, the Dow declined in three of the first six years of his partnership: in 1957 (-8.4%), in 1960 (-6.2%), and in 1962 (-7.6%) and four of the first ten (-15.6% in 1966).

For starters, here is an except from his letter discussing the General Stock Market in 1959 and his methodology for delivering returns independent of Mr Market’s Mood, giving an example of a margin of safety, as well as how concentrated his portfolio was at times (http://www.soundofgold.com/wp-content/uploads/2007.... Warning: the excepts have been retyped by me as they were in pdf format and may contain typos.

“Last year I mentioned a new commitment which involved about 25% of the assets of the various partnerships. Presently this investment is about 35% of assets. This is an unusually large percentage, but has been made for strong reasons. In effect, this Company is partially an investment trust owning some thirty or forty other securities of high quality. Our investment was made and is carried at a substantial discount from asset value based on market value of their securities and a conservative appraisal of the operating business.

We are the Company’s largest stockholder by a considerable margin, and the two other large holders agree with our idea. The probability is extremely high that the performance of this investment will be superior to that of the general market until its disposition, and I am hopeful that this will take place this year.

The remaining 65% of the portfolio is in securities which I consider undervalued and workout operations. To the extent possible, I continue to attempt to invest in situations at least partially insulated from the behavior of the general market.”

For anyone interested in how Warren structured his fees, here is a link to a letter that explains it: http://www.soundofgold.com/wp-content/uploads/2007... . Basically investors received the first 6% of profits (close to the Treasury rate) and then Buffett kept 25% of the profits above 6% as his fee. If the Buffett Partnership lost money in a year (which it never did) or if returns were 6% or less (which they never were with his two worst years being +10.4% in 1957 (Dow down 8.4%) and +13.9% in 1962 (Dow down 7.6%)), then the Buffett family did not receive any fee income.

In this Letter, http://www.soundofgold.com/wp-content/uploads/2007..., he provides some Ground Rules for the Partnership:

“4. Whether we do a good job or a poor job is not to be measured by whether we are plus or minus for the year. It is instead to be measured against the general experience in securities as measured by the Dow-Jones Industrial Average, leading investment companies, etc. If our record is better than that of these yardsticks, we consider it a good year whether we are plus or minus. If we do poorer we deserve the tomatoes.

5. While I much prefer a five-year test, I feel three years is an absolute minimum for judging performances. It is a certainty that we will have years when the partnership performance is poorer, perhaps substantially so, than the Dow. If any three-year or longest period produces poor results, we all should start looking around for other places to have our money. An exception to the latter statement would be three years covering a speculative explosion in a bull market.

6. I am not in the business of predicting general stock market or business fluctuations. If you think I can do this, or think it is essential to an investment program, you should not be in the partnership.”

An addition rule was subsequently added http://www.soundofgold.com/wp-content/uploads/2007...

“7. We diversity substantially less than most investment operations. We might invest up to 40% of out net worth in a single security under conditions coupling an extremely high probability that our facts and reasoning are correct with a very low probability that anything could drastically change the underlying value of the investment.”

Later in that Letter he presented a table where the Dow had an annual compounded rate from 1957-62 of 8.3% (up 61.6%) and the partnership annual compounded rate was 26% (up 299.8%). To damper hopes for continuing that level of success he wrote,

“My (unscientific) opinion is that a margin of ten percentage points per annum over the Dow is the very maximum that can be achieved with invested funds over any long period of years, so it may be well to mentally modify some of the above figures.” [But, of course, he did do much better than that.]

1962 was a very bad year for the Dow with a sharp decline within the year and an overall decline of –7.6%. But not for Buffet Partnership which was up 13.9%. How did he do it? In his Letter, http://www.soundofgold.com/wp-content/uploads/2007...,
WEB wrote, “…In 1962 the generals were down for the year and only an outstanding performance by both of the other two categories, “work-outs” and “controls,” gave us out unusually favorable results for the year.”

So what are “generals,” “workouts,” and “controls?” The Buffett Partnership Letter from January 18, 1964 explains
http://www.soundofgold.com/wp-content/uploads/2007...


““Generals” – A category of generally undervalued stocks, determined primarily by quantitative standards, but with considerable attention also paid to the qualitative factor. There is often little or nothing to indicate immediate market improvement. The issues lack glamour or market sponsorship. Their main qualification is a bargain price; that is, an overall valuation on the enterprise substantially below what careful analysis indicates its value to a private owner to be. Again let me emphasize that while the quantitative comes first and is essential, the qualitative is important. We like good management—we like a decent industry—we like a certain amount of ‘ferment” in a previously dormant management or stockholder group. But we demand value. The general group behaves very much in sympathy with the Dow and will in a big minus result during a year of substantial decline by the Dow. Contrarywise, it should be the star performer in a strongly advancing market. Over the years we expect it, of course, to achieve a satisfactory margin over the Dow.

“Workouts” – These are the securities with a timetable. They arise from corporate activity—sell-outs, mergers, reorganizations, spin-offs, etc. In this category we are not talking about rumors or “inside information” pertaining to such developments, but to publicly announced activities of this sort. We wait until we can read it in the paper. The risk pertains not primarily to general market behavior (although that is sometimes tied in to a degree), but instead to something upsetting the applecart so that the expected development does not materialize. Such killjoys could include anti-trust or other negative government action, stockholder disapproval, withholding of tax rulings, etc. The gross profits in many workouts appear quite small. A friend refers to this as getting the last nickel after the other fellow has made the first ninety-five cents. However, the predictability coupled with a short holding period produces decent annual rates of return. This category produces more steady absolute profits from year to year than generals do. In years of market decline, it piles up a big edge for us during bull markets it is a drag on performance. On a long term basis, I expect it to achieve the same sort of margin over the Dow attained by generals.

“Controls” – These are rarities, but when they occur they are likely to be of significant size. Unless we start off with the purchase of a sizable block of stock, controls develop from the general category. They result from situations where a cheap security does nothing price-wise for such an extended period of time that we are able to buy a significant percentage of the company’s stock. At that point we are probably in a position to assume some degree of, or perhaps complete, control of the company’s activities. Whether we become active or remain relatively passive at this point depends on our assessment of the company’s future and the management’s capabilities. The general we have been buying the most aggressively in recent months possesses excellent management following policies that appear to make very good sense to us. If our continued buying puts us in a controlling position at some point in the future, we will probably remain very passive regarding the operation of this business….. Controls in the buying stage move largely in sympathy with the Dow. In the later stages their behavior is geared more to that of workouts.

Susie and I have an investment of $2,392,000 in the Partnership. For the first time, I had to withdraw funds in addition to my monthly payments, but it was a choice of this or disappointing the Internal Revenue Service. Susie and I have a few non-marketable (less than 300 holders) securities of nominal size left over earlier years which in aggregate are worth perhaps 1% of our partnership interest. In addition, we have one non-marketable holding of more material size of a local company purchased in 1960 which we expect to hold indefinitely. Aside from this, all our eggs are in the BPL basket, and they will continue to be. I can’t promise results, but I can promise a common destiny. In addition, that endless stream of relatives of mine, consisting of my three children, mother, father, two sisters, two brothers-in-law, father-in-law, four aunts, four cousins and five nieces and nephews, have interests in BPL directly or indirectly totaling $1,247,900.”

The section on taxes in this Letter, http://www.soundofgold.com/wp-content/uploads/2007... , also gives a different picture of Mr. Buffett’s view on buy and hold investing.

“More investment sins are probably committed by otherwise quite intelligent people because of “tax considerations” than from any other cause. One of my friends—a noted West Coast philosopher—maintains that a majority of life’s errors are caused by forgetting what one is really trying to do. This is certainly the case when an emotionally supercharged element like taxes enters the picture (I have another friend—a noted East Coast philosopher who says it isn’t the lack of representation he minds—it’s the taxation).

Let’s get back to the West Coast. What is one really trying to do in the investment world? Not pay the least taxes, although that may be a factor to be considered in achieving the end. Means and end should not be confused, however, and the end is to come away with the largest after-tax rate of compound. Quite obviously if two courses of action promise equal rates of pre-tax compound and one involves incurring taxes and the other doesn’t, the latter course is superior. However, we find this is rarely the case.

It is extremely improbable that 20 stocks selected from, say, 3000 choices are going to prove to be the optimum portfolio both now and a year from now at the entirely different prices (both for the selections and the alternatives) prevailing at that later date. If our objective is to produce the maximum after-tax compound rate, we simply have to own the most attractive securities at the current prices. And with 3,000 rather rapidly shifting variables, this must mean change (hopefully “tax-generating” change).

It is obvious that the performance of a stock last year or last month is no reason, per se, to either own it or to not own it now. It is obvious that an inability to “get even” in a security that has declined is of no importance. It is obvious that the inner warm glow that results from having held a winner last year is of no importance in making a decision as to whether it belongs in a optimum portfolio this year.

If gains are involved, changing portfolios involves paying taxes. Except in very unusual cases (I will readily admit there are some cases), the amount of the tax is of minor importance if the difference in expected performance is significant. I have never been able to understand why the tax comes as such a body blow to many people since the rate on long-term capital gain is lower than on most lines of endeavor (tax policy indicates digging ditches is regarded as socially less desirable than shuffling stock certificates).

I have a large percentage of pragmatists in the audience so I had better get off that idealistic kick. There re only three ways to avoid ultimately paying the tax: (1) die with the asset—and that’s a little too ultimate for me—even the zealots would have to view this “cure” with mixed emotions; (2) give the asset away—you certainly don’t pay any taxes, but of course you don’t pay for any groceries, rent, etc. , either; and (3) lose back the gain—if your mouth waters at this tax saver, I have to admire you—you certainly have the courage of your convictions.”

In conclusion, what did I learn about young Warren Buffett and his investing style?

First, what is more striking to me than the BP annualized compound return of 29.5% over more than a decade, more striking than the BP results beating the Dow results every year, is that the BP never lost money. Never came close to losing money. Not even once. During the four years that the Dow went down, the BP earned 10.4%, 22.8%, 13.9%, and 20.4%.

Having WEB's annual fee income dependent on the BP earning over 6%/year, as well as being the steward of not only his money but most of his relatives’ and friends’ money was a phenomenal motivator for his Rule #1 of Don’t Lose Money as well as his subsequent thinking about executive compensation.

Second, the BP did not "buy and hold" as a general or exclusive principle. Currently Berkshire Hathaway with its huge capital base buys and holds companies that it purchases in their entirety; Berkshire also has owned for over a decade a relatively small number of companies’ securities (Washington Post, Wells Fargo, Coke, American Express, etc) that have gained fame as Buffett's stocks. WEB's preferred holding time may be forever--easier to do if you own and operate a company--but he’s held shares of relatively few publicly traded companies for a decade or longer.

Mr. Buffett used many tools to deliver BP returns beyond purchasing a small minority stake in stocks that sold at a discount (see above discussion of “Generals,” “Workouts,” and “Controls”). He did arbitrage, used margin to leverage his buying power, and took control over poorly performing companies, including textile manufacturer Berkshire Hathaway. He was quite savvy with fixed income investments. He occasionally shorted stocks. Without these tools, his results would have substantially suffered.

Third, young Warren realized how valuable great investment ideas were. When he ran out of great ideas in late 1969, he stopped Buffett Partnership. Mathematically, much of the Buffett Partnership's superior returns were due a few phenomenal investments in which Mr. Buffett concentrated his portfolio.

Best,

Michael

Deixo tambem o site onde podem encontrar todas as letters da BFP http://www.soundofgold.com/2007/11/29/l ... p-letters/